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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines how we should understand individuals doing pol-
itics. How should we understand people who are clearly involved with politi-
cal issues – through electoral processes, city planning, or ranting on social 
media – but would usually not identify as politicians or activists, nor channel 
their political projects through established political communities or organisa-
tions?  
Broad changes in the technological, regulatory, and governing systems un-
derlie the importance of individuals in politics, participation and the media 
landscape. Because of these changes, we now live in a world in which we 
need to understand how individual actors participate and do politics so that 
we can comprehend how contemporary politics and participation work.  
This work presents an outline for a sociological theory of political action by 
integrating a pragmatist approach to habits and situations with theories deal-
ing with cultural and tangible repertoires and resources, and by constructing 
a grammar of political speech that makes realising and inspecting the legiti-
macy of claims based on individual interests easier. 
Understanding individual interests as a basis of political argumentation is 
relevant if we want to understand political culture, in which individuals, in 
addition to collective structures, are the key players. This dissertation devel-
ops conceptual tools for understanding the legitimacy of argumentation 
based solely on individual interests. The theory of grammars of commonality 
by Laurent Thévenot is used as a basis for this development. In the re-
modelled grammar of individual interests, the legitimacy of political claims 
rests on the recognition of the rights of individuals and the construction of 
representative groups: even if actors act as individuals, they rhetorically con-
struct a wider group of people, sharing their opinion, to back the claims. Em-
pirically, argumentation based on individual interests is shown to play a rele-
vant role in Finnish political culture, which is a feature less highlighted in 
previous studies.  
The empirical articles are focused on individuals doing politics in two differ-
ent domains. These are participation in urban planning in Helsinki and the 
use of Facebook as both the nano-level context for political participation and 
as the organisational tool for individual campaigners in presidential elec-
tions. 
Firstly, the grammar of individual interests is a legitimate way of presenting 
critique against urban planning, and, thus, attempts at making urban plan-
ning more communicative do not necessarily make it more deliberative. Con-
flicts in urban planning can and should be thought of as political conflicts. 
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This argument leads to a new definition for the often pejoratively used term 
Not in my Backyard (NIMBY): if participation based on individual interests 
is as legitimate as participation based on common goods, no reason should 
exist to classify some people participating in local land-use conflicts as 
NIMBYs. The term is better used to describe the conflicts, in which local res-
idents act against planned land-use. 
Secondly, this dissertation presents evidence of a new type of political cam-
paigner: one with a background in technology or advertising rather than in 
politics and who is connected and as independent as possible. This cam-
paigner uses Facebook and other similar tools to create ad hoc campaign 
groups, utilises the cultural repertoire of the Internet, and participates in pol-
itics when (and only when) he or she sees fit. This kind of campaigner was 
crucial to the success of Pekka Haavisto in the 2012 presidential elections.  
As a context for nano-political action, Facebook also affects the way politics 
is done. The concept of nano-politics refers to the smallest possible public 
political gestures, which are, in this case, using the Facebook like button to 
send political signals. Facebook users do reflect on their liking pattern on the 
basis of previous likes, and their networked audience affects their liking be-
haviour. At the same time, the “material” tools provided by Facebook, such as 
the like button, are used by activists and “normal” users alike creatively and 
reflexively: these users send a wide range of signals by using the simplest of 
tools, and they often reflect on their own liking behaviour. 
This dissertation connects to a long line of studies showing the importance 
and heightened role of the individual in political participation. The phenom-
enon is investigated in relation to the planning authority and government in 
general, in relation to electoral politics, and in relation to a more generalised 
understanding of politics as something that all kinds of people do in the 
course of their lives.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan tapoja ymmärtää politiikkaa yksilöiden 
toimintana. Kuinka meidän pitäisi ymmärtää niitä ihmisiä, jotka selvästi 
puuhailevat poliittisten asioiden parissa – osallistuvat vaaleihin, kaupunki-
suunnitteluun, tai valittavat sosiaalisessa mediassa – mutta eivät itse identi-
fioituisi poliitikoiksi tai aktivisteiksi, saati kanavoisi osallistumistaan perin-
teisten poliittisten organisaatioiden kautta? 
Yksilön merkitystä politiikan analysoimisen kannalta korostavat laaja-alaiset 
muutokset niin teknologiassa kuin hallinnollisissa järjestelmissäkin. Jotta 
2010-luvun politiikkaa (sanan laajassa merkityksessä) voidaan ymmärtää, 
täytyy ajattelun huomioida sitä tekevät yksilöt, pelkkien kollektiivisten ra-
kenteiden sijaan. 
Tässä väitöskirjassa esitetään luonnos sosiologisesta yksilöllisen poliittisen 
toiminnan teoriasta. Se perustuu pragmatistiselle käsitykselle tilannekohtai-
sesta luovuudesta ja tapojen institutionalisoitumisesta, joka yhdistetään toi-
mijalle käytössä olevia resursseja korostavaan kulttuuriteoriaan. Näiden li-
säksi työssä kehitetään työkaluja ymmärtää ensisijaisesti toimijoiden omaan 
etuun nojaavaa poliittista puhetta legitiiminä osana poliittista kulttuuria.  
Tällainen omaan etuun perustuvan poliittisen argumentaation legitiimiyden 
hahmottaminen on keskeistä poliittisen kulttuurin toimijalähtöiselle ymmär-
tämiselle. Laurent Thévenot’n yhteisyyden kielioppi toimii perustana tälle 
kehittelylle. Tässä työssä esitellyssä yksilöiden edun kieliopissa poliittisen 
argumentaation legitiimiys pohjataan yksilöiden oikeuksien tunnistamiselle 
sekä yksilöiden kyvylle rakentaa tuekseen edustuksellisia ryhmiä: vaikka 
toimijat toimisivat ensisijaisesti yksilöinä, he vetoavat retorisesti usein laajo-
jen ihmisjoukkojen tukeen. Tällainen omaan etuun perustuva argumentaatio 
näyttäytyy työn empiirisissä osissa relevanttina ja legitiiminä tapana edistää 
omaa asiaansa suomalaisessa poliittisessa kulttuurissa. Tätä piirrettä ei ole 
aiemmassa tutkimuksessa korostettu.  
Väitöskirjan empiiriset artikkelit keskittyvät yksilöiden poliittiseen toimin-
taan kahdella eri alueella: toisaalta osallistumisessa kaupunkisuunnitteluun 
Helsingissä, toisaalta Facebookiin sekä nano-tason poliittisen osallistumisen 
ympäristönä että itsenäisten kampanjoitsijoiden organisaatiotyökaluna pre-
sidentinvaaleissa. 
Väitöskirja osoittaa yksilöiden edun kieliopin – eli toimijoiden oman edun – 
olevan hyväksytty osa suomalaista poliittista kulttuuria, ainakin esitettäessä 
kritiikkiä kaavamuutoksia kohtaan. Kaavoituskiistoja pitäisikin ajatella pe-
rustaltaan poliittisina kiistoina: yritykset avata kaavoitusta deliberaatiivisen 
demokratian suuntaan antavat tilaa myös suoralle oman edun ajamiselle. 
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Tämän myötä myös NIMBY (not in my backyard)-käsite pitää määritellä uu-
destaan. Mikäli oman edun ajaminen on poliittisessa kulttuurissa hyväksyt-
tävänä pidetty tapa osallistua, samalla tavalla kuin yhteisen hyvän ajamiseen 
perustuva osallistuminen, ei ole järkeä luokitella osaa kaavoitukseen osallis-
tujista nimbyiksi. Käsitettä pitäisikin käyttää jatkossa lähinnä kuvaamaan 
sellaisia konflikteja joissa asukkaat vastustavat muutoksia alueellaan. 
Tässä väitöskirjassa myös esitellään uudentyyppinen poliittinen kampanjoit-
sija. Nämä itsenäiset kampanjoitsijat ovat verkottuneita, taitavia teknologian 
hyödyntäjiä ja tulevat pikemminkin mainos- tai teknologia-alalta kuin poli-
tiikan sisältä. Nämä kampanjoitsijat rakentavat tilapäisiä itsenäisiä kampan-
jaryhmiä Facebookin ja vastaavien työkalujen avulla, hyödyntävät internetin 
tarjoamia kulttuurisia repertuaareja ja osallistuvat politiikkaan ainoastaan 
silloin kuin se sattuu heitä innostamaan. Pekka Haaviston (vihr.) menestys 
vuoden 2012 presidentinvaaleissa oli monella tavalla tämän tyyppisten kam-
panjoitsijoiden ansiota.  
Muodostamalla ympäristön nano-poliittiselle toiminnalle Facebook vaikuttaa 
myös politiikan tekemisen tapaan. Nano-politiikan käsite viittaa tapaan ym-
märtää tykkää-napin käyttäminen pienimpänä mahdollisena poliittisen toi-
minnan välineenä. Facebookin käyttäjien verkottunut yleisö, samoin kuin 
heidän aikaisemmat tykkäämisensä, vaikuttavat päätökseen tykätä tai jättää 
tykkäämättä jostakin. Samaan aikaan kaikkein yksinkertaisimpiakin työkalu-
ja, kuten esimerkiksi juuri tykkää-nappia, käytetään luovin tavoin. Niillä lä-
hetetään todella monenlaisia sosiaalisia signaaleja, jotka ovat paljon moni-
mutkaisempia kun pelkkä tykkään/en tykkää. 
Tämä tutkimus kytkeytyy osaksi yksilöiden poliittisen osallistumisen koros-
tumista esittävien tutkimusten pitkää linjaa. Tässä väitöskirjassa ilmiötä tar-
kastellaan ennen kaikkea vaalipolitiikan, sosiaalisen median ja muuttuneen 
hallintotavan kautta. Politiikka ymmärretään asiana, jota kaikenlaiset ihmi-
set tekevät osana normaalia elämäänsä. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
While completing the final revision of this dissertation, I was procrastinating 
by surfing Facebook, as one does. I came across a post by a bridge: Kruunu-
sillat1 was responding to a critique presented against it by a retired MEP in a 
newspaper column. The post was rather long, but presented a nicely written 
rebuttal of a nonsensical and fact-less column using the style of political fact-
checking. I chuckled and enjoyed reading the post. Because the post also 
happened to match my political views, I shared it with my Facebook friends 
and followers, wondering how the former politician might feel about being 
owned in a debate by a bridge. During the first hour, it received 30 likes, and 
within 24 hours, 34 more. 
This was doing politics. 
This dissertation is about how we should understand individuals doing poli-
tics. How should we understand people who are clearly involved with politi-
cal issues – through electoral processes, city planning, or social media ram-
bling – but would usually not identify as politicians or activists, nor channel 
their political projects through established political communities or organi-
zations? These individuals create collective structures as they see fit and then 
dump them when they are no longer needed. From this perspective, collec-
tive structures, such as parties and neighbourhood associations, are possible 
results, not starting point, of the analysis. The perspective of this dissertation 
is, thus on the creativity of political action of the individual actors, and how 
their participation should be understood. 
In this dissertation, and especially in the original articles, we meet three 
principal characters whose ways of doing politics are investigated. First, we 
meet residents of Helsinki, often called NIMBYs2, who are invested in their 
surroundings and who campaign against changes in their neighbourhoods. 
Next, we meet tech-savvy online political activists without backgrounds in 
party politics, who are re-imagining electoral campaigns. Finally, we meet 
regular Facebook users, who like away and deal with nano-political situations 
all day long. 
Broad changes in the technological, regulatory, and governing systems un-
derlie the importance of individuals in politics, participation and the con-
temporary media landscape. Because of these changes, we now live in a 
                                                   
1 Kruunusillat is a debated infrastructure project in Helsinki that connects the new 
Eastern parts of the city with the city centre. They have an active Facebook page. 
2 Not in my backyard 
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world in which, in order to understand contemporary politics and participa-
tion, we understand how individual actors participate in and do politics.  
The process of doing politics, by individuals or collectives alike, is always de-
fined by where it happens: what is the context for the action? This is especial-
ly relevant when building an actor-centric theory of political participation. 
Using the repertoires and tools available in the situation in which politics 
happens creates potential for the creativity of political action. Here, we can 
consider two aspects of the situation as being especially meaningful.  
The first are the “material” surroundings that provide the grounds for partic-
ipation and politics. These range from technical tools, such as the Facebook 
like button, that make it possible to send signals in social networks, to forests 
that can be qualified and used as a basis for argumentation when fighting for 
your backyard. Whether the physical built environment of a city or the virtual 
“built environment” of social media, these surroundings both limit the paths 
and actions of actors and make new, creative routes and ways of doing poli-
tics possible. 
The second defining aspect of the situation of political action is what is often 
called political culture. Following Ann Swidler (1986), I understand culture 
as a collection of repertoires available for actors. When political acts are un-
dertaken, these actors (residents, techno-politicians, Facebook users) engage 
with, utilize, cultivate and inhabit these repertoires, turning them into argu-
ments, organizations, justifications, memes, protest letters, and other politi-
cal objects3. 
More poetically, political culture is a landscape with formations. It is a 
dormant background structure, a valley with a repertoire of possible paths, 
old rocks brought by the Ice Age, streams and forests. Only when actors en-
gage with this background do different shapes and structures on the land-
scape become meaningful and relevant. For an army marching through a 
landscape, a rock is meaningful only if it is either in the way or useful as cov-
er in a battle (it becomes qualified, as suggested by Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006, 129, citing Carl von Clausewitz). Some features are needed and used, 
some paths are trampled and turned into highways, and some wither away 
and are forgotten, and who knows whether we have used the most suitable 
features or only the ones we came by first?  
The most suitable way to understand culture for this project is that it is the 
ever-changing set of possible repertoires, tools and their usages for actors. 
Actors act as they are wont to do: by using physical, virtual, cultural, and or-
ganizational resources as they see fit. 
                                                   
3 Naturally, all “material” resources have to be culturally constructed to be accessi-
ble, and all “cultural” resources are actualized as signs with material components 
(see, e.g., Heiskala 2014). While the dichotomy is theoretically not airtight, it helps 
to illustrate things.  
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Beginning the analysis of doing politics from the perspective of individuals 
also affects how we analyse political argumentation. We must go further 
from the often-taken sociological path of focusing on common good and col-
lective argumentation to, instead, analyse argumentation based on individual 
interests. This work presents empirical evidence of this type of participation 
and argumentation in the Finnish political culture and builds the theoretical 
tools needed to analyse them. A significant portion of this work is dedicated 
to presenting and evaluating the works of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thé-
venot. Based on a critical reconstruction of Thévenot’s work, I present a way 
of understanding the “liberal” notion of politics – how individual interests 
are integrated and legitimized into political cultures and commonalities – as 
a contest of individual wills (rather than as a contest of higher common prin-
ciples). This reworking is the main theoretical contribution of my thesis. 
Despite the focus on individual interests and individual wills, the political 
projects described in Articles I through IV are by no means atomistic. Arti-
cles I and IV describe local oppositions to building projects. Though the 
analysis is focused on the comment letters sent by individuals to a city plan-
ning authority (and is, thus, in part, an analysis of a particular implementa-
tion of participatory democracy), these actors are not working without social 
ties, or socially determined cultural and material repertoires of action. They 
talk with their neighbours, and, in some cases, draft their comments togeth-
er. Social ties, class, and old-school social organizations all exist among and 
influence actors. Actors also use the language and the argumentation they 
believe to be most effective; in other words, they assess the political culture 
and act accordingly. However, in the area of city planning and concerning the 
participation mechanism in question, the participants must act and be rec-
ognized as individuals.  
The ways in which individuals act are also influenced by the interaction situ-
ation, which is governed by its own ritualistic rules. Article III analyses inter-
action rituals and dynamics in an online context through the social meanings 
given to the Facebook like button. Facebook combines the heightened net-
work sensitivity created by the audience individuals collect through Face-
book with the rituals of interaction. Since social networking sites like Face-
book are central political arenas, understanding the rules of the interaction 
situation is crucial for analysinganalyzing politics. 
Article II, which analyses the 2012 Finnish presidential election and the 
campaign of Pekka Haavisto, makes a different, yet related point about indi-
viduals in political action. Party organizations have long represented the 
most salient collective structures, the most consolidated and official form of 
social movements. Changes in political systems, in political culture, and in 
technological and legal environments lead to situations in which party bor-
ders are blurred and the hierarchical collective gives way to more loosely 
connected groups and even super-charged individuals (such as superstars of 
fundraising, meme-making, and analytics). There is no reason to think that 
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similar dynamics would not play out in other social movements. In the age of 
social movements such as #tahdon2013, #blacklivesmatter, and #pelipoikki, 
the differences between an organized social movement and a single frustrat-
ed user with a good hashtag4 blur and, in some cases, lose their significance 
altogether. 
The empirical material in this work is collected in Finland; thus, some of the 
answers and distinctions regarding political culture given in this work focus 
specifically on Finnish political culture. Technology, however, has a way of 
making things global. While many cultural elements are local, Facebook and 
its changing algorithms, functionalities, and de-stabilizing effects on politics 
are global. The same can be said about the alleged trends of individualization 
and the emphasis on citizen participation in politics. Thus, it is possible to 
develop conceptual tools that allow us to understand phenomena that trans-
cend the borders of local and national. 
When it comes to questions of political participation and the nature of the 
polity, French and American writers have traditionally given radically differ-
ent answers. These writings and traditions work as a theoretical sounding 
board for studying Finnish political culture. Building a cohesive theoretical 
toolkit using US and French writings and using it to analyse Finnish political 
culture necessarily raises some problems related to travelling concepts 
(Luhtakallio 2012) and the different ideological constructs of polities. One of 
the main inspirations for the studies I have carried out was the comparative 
research between the US and France (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, Moody & 
Thévenot 2000, Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye, 2000) – not because of the 
method of comparison in itself, but because of the conceptual differences it 
brought to fore. In this body of literature, two pictures of political culture are 
painted: one with only the common good as a legitimate justification and the 
other with private interests serving as the cornerstones of the polity. I could 
not immediately place Finland on either side of this division. The research 
done thus far on Finnish political culture using justification theory, such as 
the works by Luhtakallio (2012), Ylä-Anttila (2010b), Ylä-Anttila (2016), 
Lonkila (2011), and Lehtimäki (2016), has not tried to systematically describe 
the relation between the Finnish polity and private interests. One of the theo-
retical contributions of this dissertation is that it builds tools to address this 
question, which is also done empirically in articles I and IV. 
                                                   
4#Tahdon2013 was a highly successful campaign to enable same-sex marriage. De-
spite being known by its hashtag, it did not use Twitter as a core organizing tool. 
#Blacklivesmatter is a US social movement that was born on Twitter following the 
2013 to 2015 police shootings of unarmed black men in Ferguson and elsewhere. 
While the hashtag and related Twitter activism have been highly visible, supporters 
also engage in traditional community organizing and advocacy. #Pelipoikki was an 
anti-racism demonstration organized in the fall of 2016.  
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This thesis is organized into five main parts. This text as a whole creates a 
more general-level framework of political sociology to combine the themes of 
the original articles. In the sections of this chapter, I present background dis-
cussions on individuals in politics from the points of view of general zeitdi-
agnostical theory, participation and urban planning, and the use of technolo-
gy and social media in (electoral) politics. These sections, along with the pre-
sent introduction, outline what I mean by individuals in this work and why 
they represent a relevant perspective for doing research on a phenomenon as 
collective as participation and politics. I also present a selection of the volu-
minous empirical literature on the subject.  
Chapter 2 builds and collects tools for understanding actors’ creativity and its 
limits, as well as the cultural, interactional, and tangible resources that are 
available to actors. This chapter reflects the literature on social movements 
and collective action, as well as the situational understanding of reality and 
its implications for political sociology.  
Chapter 3 begins by presenting and analysing the pragmatic sociology of On 
Justification (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006[1991]). This analysis has two goals: 
On one hand, it works as an example of the creativity-through-repertoire ap-
proach to action in general and the political action of non-traditional collec-
tive actors specifically. On the other hand, this chapter advances Laurent 
Thévenot’s idea of grammars of commonality to a version that is better suited 
for analysing individual interests and the ways in which individuals make 
claims in public disputes, both as individuals and as self-appointed repre-
sentatives of larger collectives. 
In Chapter 4, I present the empirical articles and their data, methods, and 
results. My doctoral dissertation as a whole is based on independent articles 
that do not share common methodological, theoretical, or empirical ground-
ings. They do, however, all address the questions of participation in political 
processes that occur not through traditional collective systems, such as asso-
ciations (very important for Finnish political culture) or parties (though one 
article discusses party politics, it focuses on how individual campaign groups 
subvert these structures). I present the methodological and empirical ap-
proaches in these articles. Chapter 5 concludes the main theoretical and em-
pirical contributions of my work. 
1.1  INDIVIDUALS, CITIZENS, AND CIVIC LIFE 
Different writers have told the story of the fading importance of political in-
stitutions and the rise of (often somehow poetically lost) individuals differ-
ently: For Robert Putnam (2000, esp. 177–182), generational changes, TV, 
and changes in work and urban structures have caused a decline in social 
capital, which manifests as the decline of all kinds of collective and civic ac-
tivities. For Micheletti (2003), individualized actions, such as shopping, be-
  6 
come carries of civic virtues. For Bellah et al. (1996), even the collective 
forms of civic life in the US are, at their deepest levels, imbued with the spirit 
of individualism that has run through the centuries in that country. Finally, 
for Inglehart (1997), the fading importance of political institutions and the 
rise of individuals speaks to changes in the macro value system from materi-
alistic to post-materialistic. 
On the policy level, the decline in electoral turnout and the perceived decline 
in other civic activities takes the headline of a “crisis of democracy”, which in 
Finland, even reached the level of an official governmental programme 
(Valtioneuvosto 2003). Electoral participation was in decline, and many au-
thors globally (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008) pronounced democracy to be in 
a severe crisis. At the same time, however, a counter-trend was emerging. 
Participatory budgeting (e.g., de Sousa Santos 1998, Boldt 2016), deliberative 
democracy, and all sorts of participatory channels created for individual citi-
zens were being implemented around the world. The electoral campaigns of 
Howard Dean and Barack Obama in the US and Pekka Haavisto in Finland 
showed signs of a new type of electoral campaign, complete with new types of 
political activists: young, networked, project-oriented people who became 
involved to have the experience of a lifetime, not a lifetime of experience (see, 
e.g., Juris 2005, Häyhtiö & Rinne 2009, Rinne 2011, Bennet & Segerberg 
2012).  
For general-level sociological analyses, individualization has been one of the 
strong meta-narratives of recent years. It also, in many ways, serves as the 
backbone for much of the discussion reviewed in the previous paragraphs. 
The withering of strong, dominant social institutions, such as classes, fami-
lies, and religion, has been said to be the new dominant structure of life 
(Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). For Giddens (1991), the central theme of 
late/heightened modernity, which is how he describes the times in which we 
are living, is the construction of individual life choices. This heightened im-
portance of life styles contrasts the more stable, traditional structures of the 
past, such as employment and family.  
From the heightened importance of life choices, Giddens drew the conclusion 
that the substance of politics will be in these lifestyles (or life-politics) – in 
contrast with the emancipatory politics of previous eras (see also Rinne 
2008, 2011 for his account of reflexive politics). With 25 years of hindsight, 
we can say that Giddens was both completely right and completely wrong in 
his zeitdiagnose: life-politics (by which many movements are known under 
the rubric of new social movements) are important and happening every-
where, but emancipatory politics (as he defines the areas of political struggle 
that have to do with rights, material well-being, and the like), or the need for 
them, did not disappear.  
We could say that electoral politics are also shifting from a collective, elec-
tion-centred political life and understanding of politics towards politics hap-
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pening on more individualized grounds. Dalton (2008) conceptualises this 
change in terms of citizenship as a change from citizen duty to engaged citi-
zenship. He characterises citizen duty as a system of citizenship in which “cit-
izens vote, pay taxes, obey the law” and engaged citizenship as “independent, 
assertive citizens, concerned with others”. He also sees the political conse-
quences as shifting from “voting to protest and direct action” and as demo-
cratic ideals focusing on “pressuring democracy to meet its ideals” (Dalton 
2008: 4). He uses both US and cross-cultural surveys to show how this global 
change in citizenship coincides with what Inglehart (1997) called post-
material values.   
If Dalton finds his redemption in a new style of political focus in citizenship, 
Schudson (1998), in his reading of the history of American civic life, finds it 
in the changing subject of civic life. For him, the analysis of Putnam – and 
other critics from the same tradition – misses the point about changes in vot-
ing and public discussion. We have entered the age of right-bearing citizens, 
an age in which politics often takes the life-political turn that Giddens envi-
sioned and in which these citizens also find new ways of doing politics. 
The idea of rights is not, in itself, central to this work, but it helps us think 
about two ideas that are relevant. Firstly, a right-bearing citizen (whether 
engaged or not) bears these rights as an individual. She makes decisions 
about her rights contextually, but essentially as a one-woman constitutive 
unit (see Habermas, 1996, 22–23). Secondly, not all individuals are citizens. 
To be a citizen, one must be qualified in a certain way and have a certain rela-
tion to the state apparatus. In the grammar of (liberal) individuals, as is re-
constructed in Chapter 3.4, these two ideas come together as the building 
blocks of a polity: Politics is about constructing a subject who possesses a 
right to be heard and whose opinions must be taken into account. In elec-
tions, this is easy: The qualification of the individual lies within the formal 
definition of citizenship. In deliberations and discussions, these definitions 
become much murkier. 
In their 2014 article “Civic action,” Paul Lichterman and Nina Eliasoph try to 
locate what actually makes an action civic. For example, an accountant work-
ing for a political party is still mostly doing accounting, not necessarily par-
ticipating in creating new political futures or deliberating about the future of 
society. They anchor the “civicness” of acts in situations of acting and inter-
acting. This point of view makes political action the property of a situation, 
rather than something that is recognizable from the structures. Following 
this line of argumentation, we can think of individuals doing politics in situa-
tions, without a strong commitment to the historical interpretation of indi-
vidualization as a general-level sociological phenomenon. 
Individuals also play a key role in many writings about macro-level ideologi-
cal changes happening in society. In New Spirit of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski 
and Eve Chiapello (2005) write about how capitalism simultaneously re-
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quires a justification – a moral promise about equality and possibility – and 
is able to encompass the main critiques directed towards it. New Spirit of 
Capitalism focuses on the justification and critique of changing capitalism 
(or how capitalism changes between the 1960s and 1990s) and concludes 
with an analysis that argues that individuality, connectivity, and flexibility 
are the primary common goods valued and provided by the new capitalist 
system. Pierre Rosanvallon (2008, 2013), in turn, looks at how the justifica-
tion and legitimacy of democracy is changing and finds individuals as the 
new key players. 
Rosanvallon (2013) suggests that we are entering the age of the politics of 
closeness, in which the central idea of politics is no longer to seek collective 
representation, but to bring forth the variety and uniqueness of each person’s 
individual life situation. Laurent Thévenot (2015) calls this the grammar of 
individuals in a liberal public:  the structure of the importance and legiti-
mate political usage of private interests, even in public discussions. Instead 
of deliberations between common goods, we will have individuals demanding 
that their idiosyncratic preferences and interests be recognized and prefera-
bly addressed.  
We can also find these changes within global, macro-level politics. Here, the 
changes take the form of international co-operation and treaties, such as 
Agenda 21 (UN 1992) and the Maastricht Treaty (EU 1992). Both include 
some version of the subsidiarity principle: that political decisions should be 
made as close to individuals as possible. These treaties do not directly dictate 
national laws, but set an idea that is implemented differently in different na-
tional contexts. For example, Helsinki, like many other cities, created a local 
implementation of Agenda 21 (see Niemenmaa 2005 for Helsinki Agenda 21 
and Alasuutari 2009, Alasuutari & Qadir 2014 for the process of domesticat-
ing international policy processes to fit local contexts and the epistemic gov-
ernance behind these projects).  
In Finland, these changes, together with the 1995 EU membership, coincided 
with a thorough change in administrative culture. This could be summarised 
as the beginnings of a move from a centralized control system to a more open 
participatory system (Tiihonen 2006: 92, Heiskala & Luhtakallio 2006).  
The 2000s also saw the arrival of the discussion about the “crisis of democ-
racy” in Finland. It turned out that, despite Finland’s reputation as a country 
with engaged citizens and hundreds of thousands of voluntary associations 
and NGOs (Alapuro 2005), Finnish citizens were actually much more de-
tached from the political system than those in most easily comparable Nordic 
countries: They voted less, were less active in political organizations and par-
ties, and were less interested in politics (Borg 2005). In Dalton’s (2008, 
Chapter 8) distinction between the duty-based and engaged dimensions of 
citizenship, Finns had nearly the lowest scores on both dimensions in inter-
national comparisons. Furthermore, compared to those in France, political 
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conflicts in Finland were more often downplayed and depoliticized (Alapuro 
2005, Luhtakallio 2012). However, other Nordic countries have also wit-
nessed a change in civil society: NGO membership is increasingly explained 
by individuals’ need to socialise and self-interest, rather than collective iden-
tification or a conviction to change the world (Wollebæck & Selle 2010). 
These developments have led the Finnish state to take, sometimes through 
experiments, sometimes through legislation, an active role in the develop-
ment of democracy. The government launched a special initiative for promot-
ing participation at both the municipal level (Kettunen 2002) and the level of 
the whole society (Valtioneuvosto 2003, Borg 2005). This democracy policy 
aimed to build individual competences and avenues for individual participa-
tion, but did not radically rethink the role of the individual or consider other 
methods of direct democracy (Perälä 2015).  
In sum, we are approaching a situation that might as well be called the poli-
tics of precious individual snowflakes, in which everyone’s private interests 
are unique and beautiful, supremely well-addressed by capitalist societies, 
finding expressions in idiosyncratic and loose ways, and very difficult to fold 
into a collective or general will.  
1.2  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 2010S: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
TENSIONS 
The process of moving towards a system in which relations between individ-
uals and the government are more “direct” than they have been in the past 
has had a particularly strong effect on how participation in urban planning, 
compared to the other areas of government, is organized in Finland. The 
Finnish urban planning process, which previously could be described as a 
field for heroic artist-designers and architects, has been developing in a more 
communicative direction. Where government and municipal officials used to 
see themselves as being in the position where they could define and even dic-
tate what the common good was, they must now be part of a discussion about 
the common good and how it should be defined (see, e.g., Jauhiainen & Nie-
menmaa 2006: 61 & 234–237, Bäcklund, 2007: 63, Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 
2010, Bäcklund et al. 2014, Niitamo 2015; most of these writers also present 
remarks that are more critical of this process). 
The Finnish Land-Use and Building Act, which regulates planning and urban 
development, was renewed in 1999 to include ideas influenced by communi-
cative planning and deliberative democracy (e.g., Haila 2002, Bäcklund 
2007, Saad-Sulonen 2014: 40–43; for an evaluation of the act, see Mäntysalo 
& Jarenko 2012, Staffans 2012, Ministry of the Environment 2014: 151–156; 
and for the analysis of the Helsinki implementation in relation to the imple-
mentations of other cities in Finland, see Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010: 344). 
The act gives city residents the right to be heard when urban plans are 
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changed and when significant new developments are planned, as well as, af-
ter decisions have been made, the right to challenge the legitimacy of these 
changes in court.  
While the act itself may be influenced by the ideas of deliberative democracy, 
it also legitimizes many of the elements of liberal or aggregative democratic 
participation (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010, Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012). The 
deliberative and aggregative modes of the law are in tension: Though the idea 
is to enable deliberation and discussion, the law can also be used simply to 
state the preferences of the residents. From the perspective of the actors, it 
becomes less about the mode of participation intended by the law and more 
about the mode that is made possible by the law (Mäntysalo & Jarenko 
2012).  As an example, from the point of view of the citizens, both individual 
interests and close affinities are presented in the form of comments that ar-
gue from principles other than common good. 
The Land-Use and Building Act, as well as its implementation in Helsinki, 
grants individual residents the right to influence local planning. The changes 
brought about by the new law, both specifically and in general, have created 
huge pressures for the municipal planning organization, which must now 
find ways to open both the procedures of planning, and the decision-making 
processes. This is done in order to include individual residents and their 
opinions and expertise in the process (Bäcklund 2007: 24–29).  
The central problem for the planning organization is, then, how to incorpo-
rate into the planning process the input offered by these actively participat-
ing individuals. The municipal structure expects to receive from the citizens 
primarily subjective opinions and testimonies about individual and local cir-
cumstances, not factual, objective, or apolitical information. The participat-
ing residents, of course, do not know this, and they likely would not conform 
even if they did know. These contradictory expectations can lead to a situa-
tion in which participation resembles customer feedback rather than demo-
cratic participation by citizens and, ultimately, in which the expertise of indi-
viduals is, perhaps, not recognized (Niemenmaa 2005, Bäcklund 2007, 158 –
159, 198, Pellizzoni 2011, Bäcklund et al. 2014: 315, Saikkonen 2015). 
In sum, the problem has been that planning officials were, for a long time, 
given supreme status in defining the common good of the city (Staffans 
2004), and the new age of individuals with situated knowledge about their 
surroundings (Bäcklund 2007) challenges this status. All in all, it seems that 
the Finnish governing structure is not quite sure what to make of these par-
ticipating individuals. On one hand, the political system sees the activity as a 
positive signal and a much-needed development of participation, which re-
quires training and encouragement (Perälä 2015); on the other hand, their 
inputs can easily be seen as messy, as nuisances or as overall difficult to in-
corporate into the official planning structure (e.g., Niemenmaa 2005, 
Bäcklund 2007, Saikkonen 2015; this dualism can be clearly seen in Luhta-
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kallio [2012], who suggests that, depending on the party, politicians exhibit 
both viewpoints, as do city planners in Niitamo [2015]; these conflicts also 
have a founding on the level of the law, as can be seen in Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo 2010, Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012, Bäcklund et al. 2014).  
If the planning process is inherently local and, by definition, centralized in 
the Finnish context, the politics that individuals do in social media (e.g., Fa-
cebook, Twitter, Snapchat), as a phenomenon, sits comfortably at the oppo-
site end of the spectrum. Still, the changes it brings to political organization 
and communications are not entirely dissimilar. On one hand, social media 
has given established organizations and social movements new tools for 
propagating their messages and for getting in touch with existing and poten-
tial supporters. On the other hand, it has enabled a completely new type of 
political protest network – for example, the global version of the Occupy 
movement – and has fuelled new types of protests, such as the 2011 London 
riots (see Bennet & Segerberg 2012).  
Even though social media comprises of networks and is about being “social”, 
it also, in many ways, emphasizes the role of the individual over the collec-
tive. In a hyper-connected network without central hierarchies or pre-set 
structures (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), viral content spreads as propagated by 
individual users. 
The way in which Dalton describes engaged citizens, as was presented earli-
er, is a useful way of thinking about these actors: They are individual, auton-
omous, and responsible. The clear break-through moment for this kind of 
citizenship in the US was, tellingly, the 2007 to 2008 Obama campaign in the 
US presidential elections and primaries. This campaign was able to tap into 
the changing norms of political ways of doing citizenship and the generation-
al changes highlighting it (Dalton 2008: 187) using social media. Article II in 
this work looks at the 2012 presidential campaign of Pekka Haavisto from a 
similar perspective. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that this kind of engaged citizenship, which is 
not as closely linked to previous electoral politics, has been highlighted in the 
dramaturgy of presidential campaigns, which are simultaneously the most 
established of establishments, but are also pronouncedly about individual 
actors: the presidential candidates (see Alexander 2010). 
Social media also changes the dynamic of the public sphere, such that estab-
lished media brands with long journalistic traditions are forced to compete 
for readership and roles with individuals armed with only their own time and 
social media accounts. Social media has greatly diminished the role of tradi-
tional gatekeepers. Connected, resourceful individuals can operate on an en-
tirely different level of distribution, and, using cheap, modern tools, they can 
also can deliver production value that was unimaginable just 15 years ago. 
Bennet and Segerberg (2012) have described the changes these technological 
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developments create in the organization of social movements by dubbing the 
phenomenon the logic of connective action. 
The term logic of connective action is used to describe the mode of action 
behind technology-enabled protest-movement-networks (such as the Occupy 
movement), which rely on easily personalized political action frames and on 
social media to organize and spread political messages. The individual plays 
a central role in this analysis: These movements rely on viral propagation 
and the spreading of memes, which constitute their organizational form. 
Bennet and Segerberg contrast this process with the resource-reliant model 
of collective action, in which social movements are the central actors and ar-
biters of resources. Individuals, thus, become the locus of action: They 
choose the frames, they employ the resources, and they operate by using the 
cultural repertoires available to them (see also Castells 2007 on the logic of 
mass self-communication and Juris 2005 for technology and activism). 
The logic of connective action, as well as the advent of social media in gen-
eral, has created all kinds of new possibilities, structures, and campaign 
styles in formal politics (i.e. the politics of parties, electorates, presidents, 
etc.) that are interesting for political sociology (see Cogburn and Espinoza-
Vasquez 2011, Vergeer 2013). The 2007 to 2008 campaign of Barack Obama 
had ripple effects throughout the world (Karlsen 2013, Lilleker et al. 2014, 
Gibson 2015), even though many of the same elements were already present 
in the 2004 US democratic campaign of Howard Dean (Hindman 2005, 
Kreiss 2012).  
Social media also supports even more autonomous styles of individual cam-
paigning in line with the concept of connective action: spontaneous cam-
paign organizations, individual projects, and crowdfunded electoral cam-
paigns (Gibson et al. 2013, Strandberg 2013, Bimber 2014). These campaigns 
can also benefit from what I have termed Autonomous Individual Campaign-
ers (Eranti & Lindman 2016): Citizens who can organize their own cam-
paigns within the larger framework created by the “official” campaign.  
The open and decentralized nature of social media and blogs can also be seen 
as having the potential to decentralize both campaign communications and 
intra-party power structures (Heidar & Saglia 2003: 222, Cormode & Krish-
namurthy 2008, Zittel 2009, Gibson et al. 2013, Carlson et al 2014). Party 
organizations, in general, have been developing from social movement-style 
mass parties towards campaign machines whose main function is to win elec-
tions.  
This new model of open, volunteer-based, connective, and even citizen-
initiated campaigning (Juris 2005, Bennet & Segerberg 2012, Gibson 2015) 
might bring radical changes to party organizations (Vergeer et al. 2011). 
While mediatized electoral campaigns used to require numerous highly paid 
professionals and centralized and professionalized party structures, the em-
phasis now lies more on capable individual actors. The use of social media 
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enables participation based on the individual interests of citizens and allows 
people to participate in novel ways other than completing campaign tasks 
laid out by the central party organization. 
1.3  CRISIS IN THE STATUS QUO 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006) define a crisis as a situation in which 
the status quo has been challenged and things cannot continue as they are, 
without some kind of solution to the conflict that is present. For them and 
the pragmatist sociology they represent, this solution comes through justifi-
cation and tests. Normalcy can be restored by deploying justifications and 
discussing. Other events that might happen in these situations include 
stronger breaches, revolutions, and protests.  
Participatory politics, the political use of social media, and forms of delibera-
tive democracy bring these kinds of crises to people’s everyday lives. In their 
mundane form, these crises can usually be thought of as invitations to en-
gage. An endless meeting (Polletta 2004) in which the future of an area is 
decided or a resident’s knowledge about an impending change in the area 
creates a situation that must be resolved before the status quo can be re-
stored. 
Then again, the participatory processes I present in this work are also deeply 
related to actual crises happening in the lives of random, ordinary people. 
When the planning apparatus fixes its gaze on an area, the status quo is dis-
rupted. Not all proposed plans become reality, but until the issues are re-
solved, a constant uncertainty hovers over people’s everyday environments. 
(Not all, or even most, planning changes are bad for the area; however, they 
certainly are often felt that way and do change things.) In this sense, elec-
tions are also a kind of crisis: The governmental system cannot continue and 
normalcy cannot be restored until elections are held and Sami Borg5 calls the 
results. 
To understand individuals doing politics, we need to look at the creativity of 
action, the collective structures, the social movements and how individuals 
interact with them, and the repertoires that are used in political processes to 
deliberate and to justify things. We need to look at the situations in which 
politics is done and to consider how the interactions and contexts of these 
situations define political action. These are the subjects of the next chapter. 
 
                                                   
5 Sami Borg is a political scientist and the director of the FSD. For years, he has act-
ed as the official commentator on the main news feed of the general elections from 
the Finnish Broadcasting Company, announcing the results when they seem clear.  
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2 CREATIVE POLITICAL ACTION AND POLITICAL 
CULTURE IN SITUATIONS 
In this chapter, I outline a framework of thinking about the political action of 
the individual in sociological terms. In the process, I engage with pragmatist 
ideas of situated creativity (Joas 1996) – that in real-life situations, people 
have critical capacity (Boltanski 2011, Boltanski & Thévenot 1999) to engage 
critically with the world, and denounce inequalities based on varied criteria.  
After that is sorted out, I’ll move to a reading of works dealing with political 
culture – on the defining aspects of the situations where individual political 
action happens – and social movements, which compose a set of tools, 
frames, and identities individuals can use, alone and together. In the last sec-
tion, I look at how interactions in situations can be used in sociological anal-
ysis of participation and politics. 
The overall strategy follows Heiskala (2000): starting from actor-centric the-
ory, and broadening the focus by using different ideas of habits and habitua-
tion to understand how culture works influences these actors, and how even 
the creative action of these actors is constrained by cultural formations. 
This approach is taken in order to construct a rough framework, which al-
lows us to take individuals as the locus of attention, but not to forget the so-
cial nature of human life and politics6. 
2 .1  THE CREATIVE SITUATION – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006[1991], also Thévenot 2015, and Boltanski 
2011) repeatedly speak of crisis as a moment when ordinary action cannot 
continue anymore, when something needs to be done to resolve a conflict 
without resorting to violence. To allow for continuation, both in terms of ac-
tion and in terms of peaceful social order, they outline a set of justifications, 
which operate on a higher level of abstraction. 
But in order to understand the critical situation, and the potential to critical 
action (Boltanski 2011), we need to look at the moment of crisis a bit more 
closely. This crisis can be seen as a special case of situation, as used by prag-
matists (Joas 1996, Dewey 2006[1927], Kilpinen 2009). A situation is when 
                                                   
6 In this work, I read the importance of the actor in political space through the dual-
action lenses of pragmatist and cultural sociology. Rinne (2008, 2011) makes simi-
lar arguments about the importance of the situation and the actor in understanding 
politics, but builds his argumentation from phenomenology. 
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action happens, when actors can follow known paths, or adopt creative strat-
egies of action. This leads Joas to classify pragmatism as a theory of situated 
creative action (1996, 132).  Boltanski and Thévenot write from the pragma-
tist perspective. Their emphasis on creativity shows when compared to Bour-
dieu (Boltanski 2011), which was their initial point of divergence: rather than 
following clear paths of action from habitus or class position, actors have a 
critical capacity of their own. The terminology adopted by Boltanski and 
Thévenot lays emphasis on the urgency of the situation – a crisis is not a 
normal situation, but a conflict, a meeting of opposing forces of some kind. 
(But see Dalton 2004, for a different look on Bourdieu and Joas.) 
A crisis, in the empirical material of this work, could be an impending change 
in the urban plans of the area, an attempt to build a new part of the city on 
the shores of Meri-Rastila – or it could be a presidential election, always ap-
proaching at their pre-destined timetable. But it can also be a simple ques-
tion of whether to like a post on Facebook, which at the same time is made by 
actor’s good friend, but contains political content she is unsure about. 
In order to have a broader understanding of political action, we also need a 
broader and perhaps more nuanced understanding of these situations. Term-
ing a situation crisis puts emphasis on the reactive nature of conflict-
resolution and thus justification – it is something employed only when nec-
essary, in order to avoid the collapse of social fabric (Thévenot 2011, Boltan-
ski 2011. This is also notable in New Spirit of Capitalism by Boltanski and 
Chiapello, where changes in the economic order create a need for new ideo-
logical justification).  
Political action, as an illuminating case among all action, can of course be 
proactive as well as reactive. New political projects are formed, new social 
movements are created, and new topics are politicized – in the meaning of 
being rendered as playable (Luhtakallio 2012, Palonen 2003). Thus, to un-
derstand politics and political action, we need to have concepts for these 
openings. 
There is one great advantage in using the metaphor of crisis: it is something 
distinct from the everyday stream of events. In times of crisis, habitual action 
cannot be followed (Kilpinen 2009, Dewey 2006[1927])7. So what lies be-
tween the generality of situation and the specificity of crisis? One way to pro-
ceed would be to think of opportunities in the same manner as crises. If crisis 
is a negatively connoted situation, a meeting of opposing forces which re-
quires active work if social order and the continuation of the situation are to 
                                                   
7 There is a potential for a mix-up here: in a general level sociological theory of ac-
tion, one can always assume mind-states of the actor, or some other inner factor to 
cause the crisis of action in absence of changes in outer world. When speaking spe-
cifically about political action, the focus is more on the relation between the actor 
and the world. 
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be preserved, an opportunity could be a positively connoted situation, where 
new formulations, new identities, new collectives, and new justifications (or 
new combinations of old ones) can be developed or deployed, in order to 
bring some change in the world. An opportunity is a situation where new 
things can be made playable – where the non-reflexive “old way of working” 
could go on, but where it would seem that the actors can gain more by doing 
something else. 
The use of the concept of opportunity here is inspired by the social move-
ments school of thought that emphasises political opportunity structures 
(Tarrow 1998), and the idea that changes in economic or political or actor-
state relations can make social movements successful or seriously hinder 
their possibilities in changing the world. These opportunities do not need to 
be economic in nature, or do not need to come because of structural changes.  
The on-going stream of events is of course not neatly divided into situations, 
crises and opportunities. They are used as an analytical tool, to understand 
the possibility of a proactive critical or creative action8.  Thus, trying to posit 
a too rigorous idea of when there is an opportunity would be outside the 
scope of this work – but certainly we can see empirical experiences of such 
cases. We can think of, for example, the political situation that led the Green 
party to abandon the previously dominant strategy of participating in presi-
dential elections in order to boost general political themes, and adopting a 
strategy of actively seeking presidency in the 2012 elections (as described in 
article II.) Part of the reasoning behind this strategic change was related to 
the perceived weakness of the Social Democrat candidate, Paavo Lipponen, 
who, despite his legendary status in Finnish domestic politics, was widely 
seen as a face-saving “dignified loser” candidate for the party. 
The problems arising from analytical divisions such as between crises and 
opportunities can perhaps be circumvented by referring to how actors them-
selves frame, or attribute these situations. Goffman (1974, 10-11), in line with 
the phenomenological roots of his sociology, was interested in how actors 
understand situations “in accordance with principles of organization which 
govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in 
them.”  Researching these understandings of the situations was what he orig-
inally called Frame Analysis – where the frame was a concept employed to 
understand the classifications of situations. We could think about the crisis 
as an objective situation, where something needs to be done in order for the 
social reality to continue existing as it is, and opportunity as a framing given 
to a situation where new political acts are possible by the actor. A similar de-
                                                   
8 The idea did not work out too well for the scholars of opportunity structures– they 
found out that it was pretty hard to clearly tell, whether opportunities for social 
movements are more bountiful when the political situation gets more dire or more 
oppressive, or when it gets more liberating and more permissive. See Edwards 2014, 
83-87. 
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velopment was made by McAdams, Tarrow & Tilly (2001:43-46): they pro-
posed moving from the idea of objective opportunities and threats to the at-
tribution and processes through which movement actors frame situations as 
such.  
To continue from an earlier example, it is by no means self-evident that a 
former heavy-weight politician such as Lipponen would be a weak candidate 
– rather, that is only one of the possible framings or attributions of the situa-
tion. It was believed that he would be unable to gather a large coalition from 
different factions of Social democrat–Greens–Left-wing voters, but that was 
confirmed only after the Haavisto campaign. In a similar way, a resident who 
actively aims at shaping the city surrounding her can see an opportunity, 
when urban planning fixes its gaze on an area. The residents of Etelä-Haaga 
used the impending changes in the area to argue for the importance of fixing 
worn-down structures. 
Regardless of whether actors interpret situations as crises or opportunities, 
their responses usually contain an element of habitual action. For Boltanski 
and Thévenot, and in the types of responses they describe, these habits come 
in the form of a limited available number of critiques (or justifications) (See 
Dalton 2004 for a stricter analysis of the relation of habits, habitus and crea-
tivity). Dalton (2004, 604) also emphasizes the need to see that all action 
includes simultaneously habitual and creative elements: “Creativity (…) 
emerges from the nature of routine activity itself”, which “can never be speci-
fied with absolute precision and demands ‘interpretation’ or ‘performance’ in 
the concrete realization of action” (620).  
So adapting Joas (1996: 132-133): in situations that are framed by the actor 
as crises and opportunities, the actor constitutes the situations and creates 
new modes of action, affected by habits and other path-dependencies, using 
the resources available to her in the context of the situation at hand. The ac-
tion is creative (the tools are always used in a contextual way, the situation is 
classified as an opportunity or crisis by the actor, new modes of action can be 
invented) but also habitual (things are not always new, but usually follow 
paths laid by the actors’ previous experiences).  
In the next three sections, I look at political culture as a context and source 
for repertoires of action to be used creatively in these situations, resources 
available for actors, and lastly, the micro-level interactions and social inter-
pretations as determinants of these situations. 
2.2  POLITICAL CULTURE PROVIDING REPERTOIRES FOR ACTION  
What is the context for all the political action? What are the habits and insti-
tutionalizations, in the context of political action, and how should we think 
about them? In this sub-section, I look at how creative action of political ac-
tors is contextualized, made possible and constrained by political culture. 
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In the following I am following Lichterman & Cefai (2006), who define polit-
ical culture(s) as “sets of symbols and meanings or styles of action that or-
ganize political claims-making and opinion-forming, by individuals or collec-
tivities. (…) culture structures the way actors create their strategies, perceive 
their field of action, and define their identities and solidarities“. As was cov-
ered in the previous section, culture both works as a creative resource, some-
thing to be used strategically, but also creates dependencies. So here habit is 
used to sneak in structure to guide and empower the actor (Heiskala 2000). 
In this (and the next) sub-section, I present several theories that have tried to 
explain how existing and (somewhat) established social movements work in 
relation to cultural and physical repertoires, in what kinds of contexts they 
work, and how they go on changing the world. The social movement studies I 
refer to in this section are presented in order to complement the picture of 
the creativity of action, bound by habits. Following Lichterman and Cefai 
(ibid.) we can ask, how should we think of repertoires, strategies, and identi-
ties, when thinking from the perspective of individual actors doing politics? 
Swidler (1986) argues that existing culture, defined as shared symbolical 
constructs, gives actors a toolbox of possible actions, with which to operate in 
the culture. It is important to note that this toolbox does not contain only 
discursive strategies, but also repertoires of action, political resources and 
connections between actors that are available in given situation. All these 
constitute the supply of political action repertoires and argumentation for the 
actors. Swidler divides life into two different modes: settled periods, where 
these cultural toolboxes can perhaps be a stagnating force, and unsettled pe-
riods (see: crisis), when ideologies are formed, and when (rather) stable ideo-
logies act as the driving generator. 
Developing this idea further, Luhtakallio (2012, 12) uses comparison to stress 
the importance of context for the toolbox: not all tools are the same, even if 
they look the same. She also stresses reflexivity  – the metaphor of repertoire 
or toolkit easily lends itself to thinking that this repertoire is somewhat static 
and that the process of choosing a tool is straightforward and does not affect 
the actor. This is not the case: tools are reflexive in a way that is not possible 
for a hammer. While Swidler speaks of strategies, Luhtakallio links these to 
the pragmatic notion of habits – which are always collectively negotiated, 
interaction-based and procedural.  
These habits, in turn, form the cornerstone of Ylä-Anttila’s (2010a, 290) first 
steps in building a pragmatist theory of social movements. Decisions made 
by actors are not always optimal, but rather follow habitual paths. Ylä-Anttila 
defines political culture as a “historically formed whole, composed of the 
shared habits of making politics, interpretations made of them, and from 
those stabilizing and longevity-bringing institutional arrangements that are 
built on the basis of these habits”. This is a stricter pragmatist-anchored for-
mulation of what Swidler alluded to, when she wrote of how in the period of 
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settled lives, political culture constrains political action and directs it to the 
existing strategies (1986). 
Within social movement studies, the ideas of cultural repertoires, and of rep-
ertoires of collective action, are well developed (Tilly 1979, 8-9): “…particular 
times, places and populations have their own repertoires of collective ac-
tion... [it] significantly constrains the strategy and tactics of collective ac-
tors.” (8-9). Tilly also makes an important distinction: these repertoires are 
comparable to repertoires of “jazz or commedia dell’arte rather than that of 
the opera or Shakespearian drama” – they are always available for mutation, 
improvisation and developments, despite their restrictive nature (see also 
Edwards, 2014:229; Williams, 1995: 126)  
Following Boltanski and Thévenot, for the residents of Helsinki, these reper-
toires appear as an understanding of the possible moral formulations that 
can be employed when denouncing plans to build and change their neigh-
bourhoods. The justifications, or formulations of common good, are recog-
nized by the actors and employed when sending the dispute letters to the city 
planning authority. For Youtube user TheIsojunno, a music producer, it 
meant participating in the Haavisto presidential campaign by creating 
mashups of Haavisto’s speeches and some dubstep beats – using the reper-
toires of electronic dance music and political Youtube mashup videos to ex-
press political statements. 
Where Swidler discusses unsettled lives – revolutions and ruptures – she 
investigates the role of more solidly-formed ideologies. I think we can better 
understand political action in all times by following the ideas of situations, 
crises and opportunities presented in Chapter 2.1. It is precisely in the cases 
of unsettled lives that “culture” assumes super-generative, tool-box like qual-
ities, where actors can creatively use the cultural tools to challenge existing 
structures, when situations can be seen as opportunities. And also, the mo-
ment of crisis Boltanski and Thévenot are writing about, the rupture when 
status quo cannot be held up, is when creativity flourishes and when tools are 
used to great advantage. 
Ylä-Anttila (2010a, 297-298) focuses on explaining how action is habitual-
ized and institutionalized into structures, rather than explaining how actors 
go on using these structures creatively. It explains how the formations of the 
terrain of the political culture are formed9.  
Ylä-Anttila also suggests the direction taken next in this chapter: frames, op-
portunity structures, organizational techniques and resources could be seen 
as similar elements that actors use to construct their political action. And yet, 
despite praising the virtues of an understanding of political culture based on 
                                                   
9 Since we are mostly dealing with cultural formation, most of these institutions ex-
ist mostly as signs or collections of signs. For the institutionalization process of 
signs, see Heiskala 2000, 2014. 
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the pragmatist conception of action, Ylä-Anttila is strongest when he explains 
how collective structures can emerge, not explaining the creative action tak-
en by the actors – even though these structures are reflexive and always cre-
ated through action.  
In the cited writings about political culture, the actors are often assumed, at 
least implicitly, to be connected to social movement organizations or some 
other groups. To understand how individuals engage reflexively with ele-
ments of culture, but are constrained (or guided by habits), we need a bigger 
toolbox: a framework with which to understand how resources, and cultural 
tools work together, and how cultural context can be used as a resource.  
2.3  CULTURAL AND TANGIBLE RESOURCES 
The social movement framing literature (the seminal text is Snow et al, 1986; 
for a review and reflection by the same authors 15 years later, see Benford & 
Snow 2000; for analysis of relation to Goffman’s framing, see next sub-
section, for a critique, see Benford 1997) offers one understanding of these 
resources. Frames are cultural resources par excellence: ways of presenting 
issues in a way that makes them relatable, or in a way that helps them have a 
bigger impact. Framing is usually seen as strategic action, as a way of pre-
senting your message in a way that resonates with the intended recipients. 
The Justification theory (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006[1991]) provides a 
different understanding of cultural resources: scales of evaluation (Lamont 
2012) for arguments based on the common good, and a vocabulary for han-
dling the distinction between the common good, private interests and inti-
mate, familiar attachments (Thévenot 2011, Thévenot 2015, Chapter 3 of this 
work). When solving conflicts and doing politics, individuals often choose 
from an ultimately limited pool of models of criticism that have been made 
available to them, historically (Silber 2003, see also Lamont & Thévenot 
2000 for the idea of justifications and market references as cultural reper-
toires with differences in national concentrations). 
While there are similarities between justifications and frames, they are by no 
means the same thing. Frames do not need to be about the common good – 
even though the abstract frame of injustice or justice, recognized as a domi-
nant way social movements frame conflicts (Benford & Snow 2002), is obvi-
ously closely related to same ideas of plurality of justifications – or, for that 
matter, about private interests either. Perhaps it is best to think of it as a se-
lection of perspective. When one thinks about justifications, one thinks of 
solving conflicts and defining the relative merits of different solutions (or 
worth of participants) through the use of tests. Framing (as defined by Ben-
ford & Snow) is a strategic process, where issues are presented in a chosen 
way to further an actor’s own agenda: what are the related actors, which his-
torical conflicts are linked to the conflict at hand, which politicians are de-
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nounced in the process. Framing in social movement organizations often in-
volves the use of an injustice frame – which in turn can be analysed by using 
the justification theory. So frames definitely can use justifications, but it 
would make no sense to treat them as the same thing. 
For example, residents acting against new developments in Rastila can frame 
the issue in a way that connects the situation either with other parts of East-
ern Helsinki – or frame the situation as an environmental conflict. If one 
thinks of the Goffman’s perpetual questions, what is happening here, one 
could also say that framing, on a broad level, happens before justification. 
Once the Rastila land-use dispute is framed as a dispute in Eastern Helsinki, 
one can deploy multiple justifications – from technical traffic modelling to a 
civic perspective of treating Eastern Helsinki on par with other parts of the 
city – to fortify the argumentation. 
Collective identities can also be seen as part of the cultural resources de-
scribed here. They are constructed, and for social movements, constructing 
them is one valid line of action (Edwards 2014, 142-144, Polletta & Jasper 
2001). But they are not a necessary condition for action, when action pre-
sents itself as an opportunity that seeks the individual, rather than the other 
way around. 
One can also think of the whole semiosis, or at least the locally available parts 
of it, as being part of these cultural resources (Heiskala 2000). Floating sig-
nifiers (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) offer one glimpse to the world of signs: popu-
list movements use signifiers (the visible part of the sign; that which refer-
ences something) that are emptied of their original meaning and can be con-
structed as populist symbols (but see also Ylä-Anttila 2016: not all populist 
signifiers float – often appropriation could be a better word for the process).  
Frames, justifications, symbols, and collective identities are different ways of 
understanding cultural repertoires as shared resources. Resource mobiliza-
tion theory (RMT, see McCarthy & Zald 2002 for a thorough review of the 
original formulations and more recent development) gives us tools to think 
about material resources, focusing on the tangible and monetary resources 
and labour as used by social movements. Social movement organizations are, 
in many ways, not different from other human projects: they require meet-
ings, meeting spaces, media attention – and when projects grow more ambi-
tious and professional, workers, managers, brand consultants, communica-
tions infrastructure, logistics; everything a corporation or an industry might 
need, despite completely different motives and agenda-settings. Even though 
many other writers contributed to the discussion, the resource typologies 
have not been thoroughly developed – and it seems that the link between 
cultural repertoires and resources has not been made (McCarthy & Zald, 
2002). 
The main benefit of thinking in terms of resource mobilization theory is to 
emphasize the calculative nature of the political process, and the rationality 
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of the actors. While cultural resources are different from physical resources, 
calculations and strategic choices also happen when choosing between these 
repertoires. This is of course one of the key insights from the framing discus-
sions (Snow et al. 1986, Benford & Snow 2000) – that framings can be stra-
tegically selected.  And it is also fruitful to emphasise the banally material 
nature of protests or political action: the level of monetary resources availa-
ble has been shown to have a clear effect on the level of protests (McCarthy & 
Zald 2002). A great deal of effort in the Haavisto campaign went to ensuring 
that even the minimal level of resources were available for the campaign: 
fundraising through micro-donations was crucial for the success of the cam-
paign. Even if the accountant of the party is not himself doing politics, the 
actors who actually do the doing would pretty soon run wither out of cash or 
into serious problems without the function.  
What I suggest is treating the different conceptualizations of cultural reper-
toires presented earlier as complementary with the RMT idea of structural 
resources.  
In the situation interpreted as crisis or opportunity, an actor constructs her 
line of action creatively by using the cultural repertoires and structural re-
sources available for her in the context, while also being constrained by the 
habits and institutionalizations. 
These resources can be tangible (money, cars, buildings), explicitly cultural 
(frames, justifications, repertoires of action, collective symbols), linguistic 
(signs, slogans), organizational (available forms of organization and technol-
ogies of organizing) and identity-related (available collective identities), legal 
(available “legal technologies”), relational (personal networks), performative 
(interaction situation and how its rules are maintained or broken) etc.10 
Established social movement organizations, such as parties or “global brand” 
NGOs, can be understood to function as pre-curated collections of these re-
sources. While these organizations try new strategies and new issues, intra-
organizational path-dependencies often lead them to follow known paths, 
even if the territory itself transmutes into something quite non-familiar, even 
if suddenly the peaceful valley is engulfed by an unfamiliar jungle. These so-
cial movement organizations offer actors a readymade all-inclusive smorgas-
bord of political action: ideologies, social networks, tested and trusted frames 
etc. Habitus and existing social structures, class positions and personal net-
works can also have a similar effect. They offer habits of life, or maybe even a 
collection of habits of the heart (Bellah et al 1996).  They offer a readymade 
set of institutions and ways of relating to these institutions.  
                                                   
10 These lists are never exhaustive. 
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Habitus, class position and position within existing social circles are both 
generative and constraining: for an investment banker, it is easier to buy in-
fluence in elections, but socially harder to start evangelizing the advantages 
of anarcho-syndicalist society – which for a student of sociology would seem 
like a more normal idea (See Williams 1995.) 
So actors are constructing their strategy or course of action from existing el-
ements. The political culture, as a context for this act of construction, is the 
generally available collection of resources and repertoires. The next sub-
section discusses how these resources are employed: how people act within a 
political culture, and how interaction and its rituals affect this action. 
2.4  FRAMES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 
The first sub-section of this chapter was about how we should conceptualize 
the situation, in how it creates crises and opportunities for political action. In 
sociology, both generally and for this thesis specifically, the works of Erving 
Goffman on every-day interaction situations, and how they are understood, 
must be noted. 
The concepts of Goffman, with the emphasis on roles assumed temporarily, 
situational effects, and inter-personal co-ordination, allow sociologists to 
build sensitive and multifaceted frameworks and understandings of diverse 
situations, and to move from abstract to concrete interaction situations. This 
view of interaction and the organization of reality has been used by many 
influential writers in social movement studies. They have been working both 
on the mediated communications of social movements, and about how these 
movements work on the everyday-interaction level. For Goffman, interaction 
situations are always tricky, contain the possibility of losing face, and rely on 
the shared interpretation of the laws of the situation to be completed without 
breaches (Goffman 1967[1955]). 
Goffman, in his analysis, is not concerned with the directly political (or, one 
could argue, even directly societal) construction of reality: “I am not address-
ing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have 
at any moment of their social lives” (Goffman 1974, 13). But, naturally, the 
experience changes behaviour, and the macro level structures become mean-
ingful only through this experience. Goffman proposed that we always, in a 
given situation, ask “what is going on here”, and that our answer to this ques-
tion determines, how we react and what part of ourselves we put forward. 
Frame analysis was the “slogan” Goffman himself gave to the “examination 
in these terms of the organization of experience“ (Goffman 1974, 8, 10-11). Or 
as Ian Hacking put it, Goffman leads us to ask “how people are made up day 
by day, within an existing institutional and cultural structure” (2014, 299).  
Frame analysis then became one of the dominant methods and frameworks 
used in social movements research literature, and also in broader cultural 
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sociology (Snow et al 1986, Benford & Snow 2000, Gamson 1985). It is nota-
ble that Goffman, the perpetual jester of sociology, was always interested in 
cases where frames, or principles of organizing reality, are misleading, are 
interpreted wrongly, or any way lead to a hilarious breakdown (or at least 
slight reassessment) of the situation. Framing, in social movements litera-
ture, however, is serious business: frames are strategically chosen, master 
frames are developed, injustices are presented. All in a form that facilitates 
communication. Micro-mobilizations happen through the expansion, ampli-
fication and transformation of these frames (even Benford himself calls fram-
ing a “cliché” in social movement studies, see 1997, 415). 
Thus, in the use of the social movement framing literature, framing and the 
analysis of the structure of the individuals’ experience, is taken to the ab-
stract level. Framing is no longer something that happens almost subcon-
sciously, an assessment necessary to functioning in every situation, but 
something that is deliberately crafted by message senders. It is transformed 
into strategic action.  
To give an example, think of the last time you (or someone you know) 
browsed the Facebook newsfeed. When you came across a particularly engag-
ing political link, did you form a strategic SWOT analysis of the merits and 
dismerits of liking the said content, or did you just instinctively click the blue 
thumbs-up button?  
We can separate between two different ways of thinking about politics and 
social movements in Goffmanian terms. The first is the earlier presented 
method of taking the fundamental idea of interpretation and rituals in social 
situations, and directing it towards thinking about strategic action. I call this 
the strategic framing perspective. Here, the idea of research is to point the 
“camera” in the same direction as Goffman would, to the rules of the situa-
tion and the individuals’ understanding of these rules, but to be interested in 
completely different phenomena than Goffman was: the strategic ways of 
forcing your interpretations of the situation to others (see Gamson, 1985). 
The second way is to follow the breaches and transgressions and rituals of 
these social situations and their rules that Goffman described, and seek to 
give, as it were, political interpretations to these breaches, and to find situa-
tions where they are politically motivated. I call this the political interactions 
perspective11. 
                                                   
11 These perspectives can perhaps be thought about with what Reed (2013) terms the 
discursive and performative dimensions of power. The strategic framing perspec-
tive could be seen as an attempt to use discursive power, to use “symbolizations and 
linguistic conventions, and meaningful models of and for the world” to “control the 
actions of others, or to obtain new capacities.” Political interactions, in contrast, are 
performative power: researching them can tell us “how situated action and interac-
tion exerts control over actors and their future actions” (Reed 2013, 203).  
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Luhtakallio (2013) uses frame analysis to construct sociological methods for 
interpreting social movement related images in the political interaction per-
spective. The central question of Frame Analysis is always “what is happen-
ing here” – for Goffman, “here” denotes a physical interaction situation, and 
“happening” refers to the flow of actions and changing circumstances. In 
analysing images, these same questions can be asked: what seems to be hap-
pening in this image? And are there reasons to doubt the first interpretation? 
Luhtakallio’s comparative work shows that the political culture affects how 
gender is represented and how activist media produce images in France and 
Finland. She analyses the images produced by activists not through master-
frames and strategically communicated injustices, but rather by using frame 
analysis as an analytical strategy to make sense of the situation. 
For Lichterman & Eliasoph (2014), the important Goffmanian concept is the 
scene-style – a set of action-patterns that are related to a recurring and iden-
tifiable set of circumstances, a scene. They use these different scenes to sepa-
rate between what they term civic action and non-civic action: situations 
where people are deliberately and sustainably trying to do something good 
for the society, in contrast to “normal” or other situations. This separation is 
used to move beyond thinking about some groups as civic groups (which 
would imply that everything they do is civic), and every other group as non-
civic (which would imply that only civic actors do civic things). 
Political interaction is at the heart of their analysis: young people, who par-
ticipate in co-ordinated action with elements of both “genuine” social move-
ment-type civic goals and goals of social work and empowerment, are able to 
distinguish between these two goals on a situational basis. They interpret the 
reality in the situations and tune their behaviour accordingly. And when 
breaches happen, such as when a youth group thought that they were receiv-
ing a prize for the civic action they had done, but instead are given resources 
because they are “in need” or “at risk”, they carry significant weight for the 
individuals (Lichterman & Eliasoph 2014, Eliasoph 2011). In similar manner, 
Edwards (2014, 214-223) terms individualized intentional breaches of situa-
tional norms by those of lesser social and political status misbehaviour – 
when the structure denies more direct forms of rebellion, the social situation 
might be the weakest link. 
In article III, which is very much about political interaction, we use 
Goffman’s earlier work on Face-work (1967), on deliberate attempts at main-
taining a positive self-image, as well as other participant’s positive appraisal 
of you in a situation, to understand the dynamics of Facebook like button. 
This usage naturally means we have to think situation in the terms of virtual 
situation, which might not be as immediate as a physical situation, and that 
we have to stretch the notion of Face, since it can no longer be tied to the 
immediate physical situation.  
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For Goffman, face-work is something that happens through the most minute 
of gestures – raised eyebrows, shifting weight from one foot to another, 
sideway glances all convey much information. So for us, Face-work is a tool 
to understand nano-political action: Facebook Like button (or the new-
fangled emojis: haha, wow) is the online equivalent of these minute actions. 
Whereas undeniably way less subtle than the latter, they constitute an im-
portant corpus of face-work taking place in contemporary online sociability 
These nano-politics, and social media in general, blur the distinction between 
micro-level interaction and public-level media. In the age of the newspaper, a 
message spread through the reading public just because an editor decided it 
should spread. In the age of social media, the process of spreading and the 
nature of the media make it dependent of these micro-level interactions. 
Some of the behaviour on nano-level is strategic, on the level of strategic 
framing, but we assume that, with billions of likes sent every day, much of it 
happens on the level of political interaction.  
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3 JUSTIFICATION THEORY AND THE GRAMMARS 
OF COMMONALITY 
In the previous chapter, one of the elements of the creativity of the individual 
was the ability use cultural repertoires in conflict-resolving. This chapter is 
dedicated to one of the possible conceptualizations of such repertoires. In 
this chapter, we look at how claims are justified, conflicts are resolved, and 
the construction of the common good is situationally understood. On Justifi-
cation (2006[1991]) by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, with its numer-
ous further developments, have given us tools to approach these questions12.  
In what follows, I present the justification theory and pragmatic sociology 
with their major developments. I focus specifically on the elements that are 
applicable to discussions on the public sphere. This move from philosophical 
and anthropological level to the political sociology in the public has been 
characteristic of what could be called the HEPO13 operationalization of the 
justification theory – using the complex theory mainly as a description of 
culturally available repertoire of justifying claimsmaking (See eg. Luhtakal-
lio, 2012, Ylä-Anttila 2010b, Ylä-Anttila 2016, Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 
Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio 2016, Lehtimäki 2016, Gladarev & Lonkila 2013, 
Lonkila 2011, Lehtonen & Lonkila 2008, Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015, Arti-
cles I and IV in this work.) 
3.1  ON ON JUSTIFICATION 
As noted in Section 2.1, human beings have a critical capacity – a capacity to 
justify their positions, to challenge existing structures and situations (Boltan-
ski 2011, Boltanski & Thevenot 2006, 1999). If this capacity was completely 
creative, flexible, and free, arguments would often be complete gibberish, 
and compromise between these would be all but impossible – this would also 
make sustaining a common society (even with all the possible reservations) 
impossible14. As noted in Chapter 2.2, justifications are one part of this 
                                                   
12 This chapter is a direct result of the efforts of Politics After Modernity reading 
group. This text only reflects the interpretations of the author – which certainly are 
not all shared by the other members. This is the sweetness of social theory. 
13 Helsinki Research Group of Political Sociology, www.politicalsociology.org 
14 Boltanski, and especially Thévenot in his later works, are building a picture of a 
pluralistic, not an atomistic society – and this difference is related to having a dis-
creet but large number of possible justifications. I thank Tuukka Ylä-Anttila for this 
observation. 
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shared set of cultural repertoires. This means that they have to be recogniza-
ble by others, otherwise communicating15 with them would be impossible. 
Justification theory is actor-centric, rather than structural, in the pragmatist 
vein – with cultural repertoires at individuals’ disposal (see Chapter 2.1 in 
this work). These repertoires are dynamic and local, but not random, or al-
ways easily changeable. They are institutionalized habits (Gronow 2008, 
Kilpinen 2009, Heiskala 2000). 
Through analysis of modern-day texts and manuals, ethnographic research, 
and excursions through western moral history16 Boltanski and Thévenot 
found six orders of worth – six definitions of the common good that can be 
referenced in support of a position in a conflict situation (2006, 1999). Using 
a different conceptualization, these can be described as repertoires of evalua-
tion: each order of worth forms a scale, with which things, people and ar-
rangements can be evaluated based on a shared principle (See Lamont 2012, 
Lamont & Thévenot 2000). These repertoires can then, in political argumen-
tation, be delivered to support given positions. 
The model of an order of worth, presented in On Justification, includes more 
than just the common good, or principle of evaluation. Individuals, as well as 
non-human things and arrangements, can be ordered according to a set prin-
ciples of the common good. These orderings are always temporary; they 
change according to situations and according to the arrangement of material 
objects in these situations. This ordering is what allows us to resolve conflicts 
– since the basis of the ordering is supposed to be shared and generally un-
derstood, all parties of the conflict can, once the ordering is decided upon, 
agree on it as the basis of the compromise or solution.  
The idea of temporality (or situationality) is introduced to keep the basis in 
common humanity clear: even if an actor is once worthy – right in the ques-
tion, uses her environment to win a test to qualify her opinions – she cannot 
claim always to be in that position. This also allows for situational creativity 
and critique – a person, who is “worthy” in one context (father, when decid-
ing the marching order of the children on a field trip), might not be worthy in 
all situations (politics, car crashes, building of a nuclear power plant), and 
even if he is, it is not because he is a father (Boltanski 2011: xi, On Justifica-
tion: 65-79). This shift to situational qualifications and the critical capacity of 
individuals, and to focusing on actors instead of structures was originally 
intended as a move against the project of Bourdieu – against the idea of rela-
                                                   
15 Both in the sense normally meant, and in the specific way Thévenot uses it in 
2011, 2015: making things common.  
16 With authors such as St. Augustine, Saint Simon, Bousset, Rousseau, Hobbes, 
Adam Smith. This moral-philosophical background is only one facet of the work, 
and shall not be further discussed here – except for the case of Rousseau and the 
relation between general will and the common good. 
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tively stable habitus and entrenched class positions or fields (Boltanski 2011, 
Boltanski and Thévenot 1999). 
There exists a limited repertoire of principles of common goods, which can 
be referenced in a situation, crisis or opportunity, when status quo cannot or 
will not continue as it is. Disputes between these common goods can be re-
solved either by forcing compromises between them, or by using tests. To 
test is to use the definition of the common good as a tool for evaluation: 
which of the proposed ideas or plans actually delivers what it promises? This 
is what separates justifications from being “mere” frames or discourses in the 
sense of social movement framing (Benford & Snow 2000) – they are not 
only about words, but can always be challenged and tested with real-world 
physical objects.  
In land-use disputes, these definitions of common good, or orders of worth, 
are used to criticize the proposed changes in urban environments. The con-
struction of the claims and the argumentation supporting them often relies 
on the material urban environment – local area is mobilized as part of the 
argumentation. 
Next, I shall present these principles of valuation, or orders of worths,17 us-
ing examples from the data used in Articles I and IV: said arguments against 
changes in the urban landscape in two parts of Helsinki, Haaga and Rastila. 
In Haaga, new housing is being built to complement an existing urban area, 
and in Rastila, a beloved recreational green area is being considered for a 
place of a new urban development (for a more thorough explanation, see 
chapter 4.1). Each order is presented here with a test: how arguments on the 
rhetorical level might be resolved by referencing the physical (etc.) surround-
ing. 
                                                   
17 These presentations are most directly adapted from Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 
2000, for it presents the formulations in their most understandable form. One rea-
son for the impenetrableness of the concepts is that the original choices of terms 
was in some places rather poetic, and the original model presented much more 
complicated when compared to what is usually used in empirical operationalization 
and what is presented here.  
  30 
1. The Domestic Order, where tradition and esteem are the modes of evalu-
ation.  
The area [of Haaga] has a rich history and tradition. It should 
be preserved as it is. 
Here, the tradition and history of the area are seen as valuable as such. A test 
would be to see, which of the possible plans leaves the area suitably un-
touched. In the case of Rastila (presented in Article IV), the active residents 
decided that all the possible options contained too drastic changes for the 
survival of the traditional outlook, and rejected them. Another way of testing 
this claim would be to see, whether the area of Haaga actually qualifies as a 
historically preserved neighbourhood, and if it does, in which sense? 
2. Civic order where collective interest, equality and solidarity are 
used as the modes of evaluation. The relevant test is that of solidary and egal-
itarian principles: is the plan just? Was the process correct? Did everyone 
have her legal change to participate in the discussion? Are all areas treated 
equally? 
Haaga already has less green area than other parts of the city 
– it is not fair, if they are reduced even more. 
In the civic order, since the evaluation is based on collective interest and sol-
idarity, weight is given for arguments of justness and fairness on the collec-
tive level, not from the perspective of individual rights. (This distinction is 
explored in more detail later.) So a test would be to find out, which of the 
competing plans treats different parts of the city in an equal way, or to see 
whether the participation-process was done properly, whether information 
about the planning change was available for all residents, and whether the 
final decision was made by a democratically elected body. 
3. Industrial Order is based on efficiency. Good is evaluated by what is effi-
cient, measurable, and technically provable and reliable. 
Our model shows that the streets here would be severely con-
gested, if these new houses were built. 
The industrial order of worth has been shown to be the one most commonly 
available in Finland – the biggest hammer in the toolbox (Luhtakallio 2012). 
A test could be a computer simulation of different traffic models, or the com-
parison between how many residents can use the new developments. 
4. Green order is not included in On Justification (which is a clear omission), 
but it is described by Lafaye & Thévenot (1993). The mode of evaluation is 
based on the environment: things, which preserve nature, conserve biodi-
versity, or help it to flourish, are valuable.  
The forest in question is a habitat for diverse groups of animals 
and plants, including foxes and birds. It should be left to grow. 
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In this order, a test is: what is sustainable? What is renewable? What helps 
biodiversity? Often in environmental conflicts, the central issue is not, 
whether the sustainable of environment-friendly outcomes are preferable, 
but how to define them. Thus, conflicts often happen inside the green order, 
and about qualifications inside sustainable solutions (Thévenot, Moody & 
Lafaye 2000, Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015). 
5. Fame Order, where things are evaluated based on their fame, renown and 
popularity among people. What is famous, well-liked or receives the most 
eyeballs, is good.  
As we can read from the words of a famous psychologist N.N, 
we should have more recreational areas in the city. 
Tests are constructed based on popularity, audience and recognition. As we 
can see in article III, the Facebook like is very much a creature of the Fame 
Order – all billions of status updates are easily rankable in order of populari-
ty based on signals sent with the Like button. 
6. Inspired order is constructed by valuing grace, spirituality and individu-
al creativity – everything, where people work with passion, enthusiasm, 
and inspiration. Even though it is based on religious texts, the phenomena it 
describes are by no means only limited to religious concerns. Inspired evalu-
ation happens in the realms of art, in creativity management, in science.  
The forest gives us residents a change to regain mental strength 
and breathe among the bustle. 
Tests are based on creativity, newness, but also holiness, deepness and on the 
level of commitment. In empirical research, this order has not usually been 
part of the Finnish toolbox used in public discussion, but was found in e.g., in 
the emphasis on creativity in Finnish yearly corporate earnings reporting 
(Malmelin 2011) – and in the data in Article IV, where discussion about the 
silhouette of Helsinki, especially when approached by the sea, takes a com-
pletely inspired turn: in the comment letters, the beautiful silhouette of Hel-
sinki becomes the central device for evaluating planning. 
7. Market Order, where evaluation is based on the monetary good, and 
functioning of the markets, on competitiveness. What makes money in mar-
ket works, and is good.  
The proposed planning changes would be detrimental to the 
economic well-being of the city. 
This is the central evaluative principle of capitalism – what is seen as valua-
ble by others is valuable, and things that are seen as more valuable, are more 
valuable. One of the projects Boltanski and Thévenot undertake in On Justi-
fication is to show that the market order, despite common assumptions, is 
very much a moral order indeed, dependent on the separation of things and 
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persons and so on (43-63). A test would be to see which of the competing 
plans cause the greatest rise in the apartment prices in the area. 
* * * 
The specific philosophical construction of these principles is, of course, both 
much more nuanced and much more poetic, than is possible to present here. 
In On Justification and in subsequent articles (most notably Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999), the authors present an eloquent and thorough model where 
each of the orders of worth includes an exemplary idea of a “city” that func-
tions as the referent, a principle of making differences between people in 
things, and a symbolic sacrifice that is required in order to fulfil the required 
degree of worths. This model is reproduced here only insofar as it is neces-
sary in order to use these justifications empirically, in public or semi-public 
discussions: to understand them as cultural repertoires of evaluation availa-
ble for actors doing politics. 
In On Justification, the civic order of worth functions as a sort of meta-order 
or model: the civic generality is one where “all relations, if they are to be le-
gitimate, must be made publicly known with the reference to the collective 
entities (…) that ground their general interests” (11)18. If the idea of common 
goods and orders of worths is dependent on the idea of general will, and rep-
resents argumentation about how that general will should manifest itself, its 
historical referent is in Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762). All of the orig-
inal six orders of worth base their model of common good on a seminal text 
in political philosophy, and for civic worth, that text is also The Social Con-
tract. So the model of public justification is, as a whole, based on the idea of 
general will as a transcendent concept: not a sum of individuals wills, but a 
collective thing above those – the will of a sovereign (formerly monarch, re-
cently state).  
Next, I shall (shortly) present comparisons, critiques and further develop-
ments, before moving into regimes of engagements and grammars of com-
monality, which are Laurent Thévenot’s project of broadening the analytical 
framework to include differing ways of constructing both the argumentation, 
and thus also the community.  
3.2  CRITIQUE AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE JUSTIFICATION THEORY  
Boltanski and Thévenot focus on interactions between people and objects on 
the abstract and personal level – on theoretical texts and on interaction situ-
ations. Their focus isn’t on public justification. Actually, in their work, the 
concept of public hardly figures at all, even though all of it is understood to 
                                                   
18 For this (and many other) idea(s), I am grateful to Eeva Luhtakallio and Tuomas 
Ylä-Anttila.  See also Ricœur, 2000. 
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happen within the context of a Habermas-style public sphere (Habermas 
1991, Boltanski 2011, Lamont & Thévenot 2000 – also referenced in On Jus-
tification).  
Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio 2016, Luhtakallio 
2012, Ylä-Anttila 2010b) focused on analysing explicitly public justification, 
by operationalizing the theory as public justification analysis. They aim at 
providing a clearly-defined method of describing usage of the common good 
in media debates. They combine the political claims analysis, developed by 
Koopmans & Statham (1999) to analyse protest events and political claims 
presented in them, with the idea of justifications. A justification is the usage 
of the orders of worths to back a claim presented. The resulting method rec-
ognizes different usages of justifications (critique, compromise, claims-
making) and different types of actors (NGOs, individual citizens, states) and 
makes a quantitative difference between critical and positive justification. 
This sort of justification analysis aims at building a quantifiable picture of a 
debate or an issue (see Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015). It tries to understand 
how political actors present their argumentation in a situationally relevant 
way.  
One of the critiques of the justification theory (illustrated by Honneth, 2010) 
is that the genealogy of the orders of worth is dubious at best. Boltanski and 
Thévenot illustrate six different justifications, which they base on ethno-
graphic data, political philosophy and different French workplace manuals. 
These six are perhaps as good a description of different possibilities as any, 
but there are bound to be some problems with their universal application. 
Within the theory, they are thought of as being universal and thus completely 
independent of the broader context of political culture – of the broader rep-
ertoire of cultural tools and symbols.  
If justifications are mainly thought as different definitions of the common 
good, and if the fact that these are historically contingent and evolving con-
cepts is acknowledged, we stand on firmer ground.  They might seem the 
same all around the world, but their usage and construction is different (See 
Luhtakallio 2012, 12). It is not possible to produce a definitive and non-
changing set of definitions for the common good – but this is not necessary 
either. These justifications are thought to be an evolving project: when 
Boltanski and Chiapello wrote  the New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), they 
proposed that the order of the project could be in the process of formation – 
it has not always existed, but rather represents the changing moral frame-
work of contemporary society (they also respond to the critique in page xxi, 
see also Wagner 1999).  
Sorsa and Eskelinen (2011) criticize the Justification theory and public justi-
fication analysis specifically for not including differences between diverse 
moral philosophical orientations – deontic, utilitarian, and virtue-based eth-
ics. This critique, while providing a possibility of a more detailed empirical 
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analysis of moral conflicts in the public, does not pose an existential chal-
lenge to the theory. Sorsa and Eskelinen are primarily concerned about con-
flicts and critiques within an order of worth, but look at it from the perspec-
tive of a moral conflict. Intra-order conflicts, according to On Justification, 
are resolved with tests, with using the material world to test the claims made. 
So it perhaps does not matter as much, whether differences between compet-
ing ideas stem from the difference between deontic and value-based ethics, if 
a test can be used to settle the conflict between these competing ideas.  
Their other main critique of Sorsa & Eskelinen highlights the fact that justifi-
cation analysis is not suitable for analysing all kinds of moral conflicts in the 
public sphere. Their example comes from the area of economic policy, and 
especially There-is-no-alternative politics: if some actors have strong enough 
status within a discursive field, they can use their position to suppress critical 
ideas and speakers. On Justification does indeed focus on certain kinds of 
moral discussion. The central idea of Boltanski and Thévenot is to present 
possibilities for civilized discussion – a discussion which can reach conclu-
sions and which includes all the speakers. In their construction, eugenics is 
an illegitimate worth (despite having founding texts and a clear principle for 
evaluating the worths of individuals), because it does not treat all humans 
equally. Thus, discussions based on racist motives and arguments about the 
superiority of a race (or a religion) are left outside the framework. This oper-
ation has clear benefits, but also limits the possible targets for analysis – and 
brings in a normative streak into theory.  
Boltanski and Thévenot were by no means the first to recognize importance 
of using different definitions of the common good and to place emphasis on 
the conflict over the definitions (see Plato, Aristotle). Waltzer’s Spheres of 
Justice (1983), based on a similar idea of plurality in the instances of justice, 
is a work in moral philosophy, not sociology – but served as one of the inspi-
rations for Boltanski and Thévenot, along with Rawls (On Justification, 14-
15). The concept of assemblages and qualified non-human actors as part of 
the justifications, as well as the empirical focus, separate Boltanski and Thé-
venot from Waltzer (Ricœur 2000, 86, see also Wagner 1999).  
Williams (1995:129) comes closer, when he suggests that there exists a “rep-
ertoire of rhetorical constructions of public good”, which is “historically and 
culturally bounded”. For Williams, scholar of religion and religious social 
movements, there are three different models of how common goods are con-
structed: covenant, contract and stewardship. The stewardship model re-
quires that humans are seen as mere stewards, and that the primary concern 
is that of how the nature is doing: “humans are not a privileged species, the 
good society will live in harmony with nature, not dominate it for its own 
purposes.” This is similar to Lafaye & Thévenot’s green worth (1993). Wil-
liams’ third model is presented in Chapter 3.4 – since it is directly linked to 
the way common good and general will are used in these theories. 
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For purposes of this dicussion, the Covenant model is more interesting. It is 
built on the traditional US religious conception of a moral community – 
where moral authority always derives from God (130-131). This model is de-
fined by its reliance on a transcendent authority, much like that of the in-
spired order in On Justification. In practice, the way Boltanski and Thévenot 
write about the inspired polity comes closer to a more general sort of inspira-
tion, creativity, and vision than the pure religious moral authority posited by 
Williams. This might be because of differences in the public spheres of the 
US and France – the latter of which guards its secularity quite vigorously. In 
Finnish political discussions, inspiration-based arguments rarely if ever ac-
tually refer to religious practices or the authority of God. Williams brings the 
model of the covenant closer to the domestic order of worth, with God as the 
authoritarian father figure. According to Williams, the model has implica-
tions also outside purely religious settings or communities. In non-religious 
settings, similar ideas are manifested as duties – towards the polity or the 
state, or towards the grand figures of the communities or parties (for com-
parison, see the duty-based model of citizenship presented in the introduc-
tion, by Dalton 2008).  
This is also one way of highlighting the habitualized and thus normative na-
ture of the public sphere: in the Finnish urban planning tradition, this kind 
of referring to moral authority would be inconceivable. The covenant model 
of common good is not part of the cultural repertoire. 
If justification theory has another important milestone on the level to On 
Justification, it is The New Spirit of Capitalism by Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello. They present a macro level cultural look at how capitalism, and 
especially its “justification” have changed between the 1960s and 1990s. New 
Spirit of Capitalism uses much of the same concepts and ideas as On Justifi-
cation, but has a surprisingly different take on them, in particular vis-à-vis 
the focus of analysis.  
New spirit of capitalism is not intended as a pragmatist analysis on the justi-
fications for diverse positions used by people in situations. Rather, it contin-
ues the Weberian project of searching for the geist of capitalism – the legiti-
macy of the collective of institutions and relations known as capitalism. For 
Boltanski and Chiapello, the term the geist, or one important part of it, is the 
justification. In their telling, capitalism always needs a moral system to pro-
vide legitimacy for it, and promising justice where capitalism naturally pro-
vides none. In a word, it needs justification. Thus, Boltanski and Chiapello 
use the same orders of worths that were used to settle critiques and conflicts 
on a micro level in On Justification, to explain and settle institutional level 
uncertainties of the whole modern human life.  The power of the formula-
tions given in On Justification is that they seem completely adaptable to this 
kind of macro level grand theorizing. 
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For earlier 20th century industrial capitalism, this justification came from 
stability – workers in industrial context could rely on rather stable careers, 
and rising standard of living. In New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and 
Chiapello present the order of the project as the new spirit of capitalism. It is 
now 8th justification. The logic of belonging and ordering comes from pro-
jects (temporal assemblages of peoples and things with a stated purpose, al-
ways reconnecting, always worried about what the next project could be and 
could one be part of it) and the common goods used in evaluation are those 
of flexibility, adaptability and connectivity, in the spirit of Castells (1996).  
This kind of justification actually can be seen in the empirical material used 
in this work. In Articles I and IV, some of the arguments for (and against) 
specific land uses are about flexibility and being open for future projects, and 
being able to direct flows of people better. It is also clear that the justification 
of project is the central guiding principle behind the electoral campaign of 
Pekka Haavisto described in Article II: an electoral campaign is conducted, 
not by stable party organisation but primarily by a loose collection of volun-
teers connecting on Facebook. The valuable campaigners were those with 
skills needed in the moment – but also those who could forge links between 
separate campaign groups (see also the logic of connective action, Bennet & 
Segerberg 2012). 
3.3  THREE GRAMMARS OF COMMONALITY 
After On Justification, Laurent Thévenot focused on recognizing different 
types of action, and how they relate to justifications, public discussion and 
political action. While On Justification is a forcible book, and includes the 
possibility of being an all-encompassing theoretical work (describing all the 
possible acts of valuation and disagreement possible), it clearly feels like 
some types of arguments and actions could be analysed more deeply using 
different vocabulary – to stay within the realm of common good would be to 
operate residual categories.  
One of the most important pointers in this direction comes from the compar-
ative work Laurent Thévenot did with Michèle Lamont (Lamont & Thévenot 
2000, Thévenot & Lamont 2000), where clear differences in construction of 
the public good, and the importance and legitimacy of individuals and their 
preferences, were shown between the US and French polity (Moody & Thé-
venot 2000). The justification theory is focused on the different models of 
common goods, and all the justifications are, by definition, collective. Thus, 
references to the private interests of the actor, though numerous in empirical 
situations, cannot be easily incorporated in the justification analysis. 
Thévenot’s solution was to present three types of cognitive formats and ways 
of engaging with the material world, that are related to three general types of 
presenting arguments and solving conflicts called grammars. (For engage-
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ments, see Thévenot 2001, 2007, and for the grammars, see Thévenot, 2011, 
2014, 2015.) 
On Justification presented the level of justifiable public action, where argu-
ments, people, and arrangements are general, based on a higher common 
principle of evaluation, and rely on the concept of general will. In this type of 
action, or argumentation, there is no place for intimate arrangements, and 
special attention to loved ones. Thévenot proposed two other regimes of en-
gagements that are below the level of abstraction of the presented regime of 
publicly justifiable action. 
These regimes of engagements are regime of familiarity and regime of the 
planned action. Each of the three regimes is related to what Thévenot (2011, 
2015) calls the grammar of commonality: set of functional rules about how 
claims are presented and evaluated, how can people voice their differences 
and grievances, but still be part of the same community, and how to separate 
legitimate claims from non-legitimate ones. 
I shall first present these regimes, and then engage in a critical re-reading of 
the regime of the plan, and its related grammar of liberal individuals. This 
grammar of political participation has been previously undertheorized within 
the justification theory19. For Thévenot, the central question is, how are 
communities kept together, despite of differences between members (2015, 
82). As with justifications, these grammars are here interpreted as cultural 
repertoires, with evaluation and valuation on central place. 
In On Justification, all evaluation is based on abstract level common good. 
The idea of three different regimes opens the possibility of different criteria 
for evaluation. So, in addition to the cognitive formats and relation to the 
material environment, also the mode of evaluation plays a crucial role. It is 
notable, that the ideas underlying these three grammars exist in some form 
already in On Justification. The Market Worth includes notions that lean 
towards the liberal grammar, and the domestic worth is almost identical to 
what was here described as the grammar of close affinities: domestic mode of 
generality is described as being expressed in terms of trust and being based 
on “personal attachments to persons and things,” “established traditions and 
precedents” and within economic context being valorized by “specific experi-
ence acquired by staff members” (2006, 10). And as previously was shown, 
On Justification is written from the point of view of the civic order of worth. 
                                                   
19 Which is not to say that various branches of liberalism are undertheorized as such. 
This work is not the right forum for the constructive re-reading of the tradition of 
liberalism, which is why the concept is avoided as much as possible: when used 
sloppily, it definitely creates more problems than it solves. See Habermas 1996, 
Benhabib 1996 and Mouffe 1999 for liberalism in the context of deliberative democ-
racy. 
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The regime of familiarity and the grammar of close affinities are on the “low-
est” level, most intimate and most dependent on the personal. The central 
good is familiarity and feeling of ease, emotions are expressed and emotional 
attachment to people, objects, and places are cherished. We react more force-
fully to threats against places that are dear to us. Lonkila (2011, also Gladarev 
& Lonkila 2013) has a fine depiction of St. Petersburg park activists that refer 
to particular trees as their brothers. They oppose cutting the trees, but not 
because of abstract principles of common good, but because the trees are re-
ally meaningful to them, because they are emotionally attached to these 
trees. And Ylä-Anttila (2016) shows how a cultural symbol with strong emo-
tional resonance can, even in public discussions, be appropriated for populist 
political use. This political use gets its power precisely from the strong rela-
tion and familiarity. 
The relation to objects is central in many ways (Thévenot 2001): one feels at 
ease in one’s home neighbourhood, when one almost intuitively knows where 
everything is, knows the opening times of shops, knows the people who one 
meets in the streets, has an emotional attachment to many of the objects sur-
rounding daily rituals (trees, rocks, little nooks and crannies in the paths), 
and constructs personal arrangements (what side of the road is usually taken, 
which coffee shop one visits, where one jogs). Pleasure is derived from rou-
tines and uncontested habitual action.  
When moving from the personal level towards the public, the regime be-
comes a grammar of close affinities, which is a delicate thing: how to com-
municate these private arrangements and personal attachments in a way that 
is meaningful to anyone besides the speaker?  It is possible, but obviously the 
nature of the public sphere (Habermas 1991) severely limits these possibili-
ties (see Ylä-Anttila 2016). Blok & Meilvang (2014) have used the level of fa-
miliar engagements to highlight the problems political actors are having in 
presenting knowledge created and relevant in the familiar format to the pub-
lic discussion in the context of local land-use disputes. 
The model of community implicit in the grammar of close affinities is some-
what closed and limited – it is based around the idea of intimate connections, 
and these are not forged easily. Thévenot (2015) alleviates this by highlight-
ing the role of hospitality, of the possibility that stranger, if shown the sacred 
places of the community, can appreciate them and the bonds that make them 
meaningful, even if she does not share the connection herself. 
The regime of planned action and the grammar of liberal individuals in the 
public is what could also be called “business as usual” – aspiring towards 
goals, choosing the means of reaching those goals, “projecting yourself in the 
future”. This is contrasted with the regime of publicly justifiable action, in 
which action is “oriented by the demands of public order” and “evaluation 
must be valid for a third party and characterized by generality and legitima-
cy” Thévenot 2007, 417). The regime of public justification is, thus, con-
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structed as a special case of purposeful action – for all the action consists of 
demands made in the public must be purposeful, and depend on the idea of 
actionable plans (Thévenot himself does not explicitly define the relation be-
tween these two regimes of engagements in these terms). 
This approach becomes problematic when moving from the cognitive formats 
to public (or semi-public) agreements or disagreements – when moving from 
cognition and relation to objects to arguments made in the public polity20.  
The grammar of individuals in the liberal public (see Thévenot 2011, 2014, 
and 2015), which is based on the regime of plan, clearly grasps something 
relevant about public goods and arguments: not all arguments build on the 
expressed or explicit idea of the common good. Some people are only worried 
about themselves and their monetary well-being, other people value deals 
and plurality of opinions more than agreement or even a possibility of a gen-
eral will. This is shown in Articles I and IV in this work: many residents of 
the contested parts of the city are explicitly and solely concerned about their 
own properties and backyards – or that of their immediate communities.  
This mode of making direct references to the individual interest of the actor 
is seen as less general and less legitimate than referencing the common 
goods, or justifications. This shows in Thévenot’s own comparative work: in 
France, individuals and references to individual preferences were seen as 
illegitimate in public discussion, while they were sometimes even used as the 
backbone of argumentation in the US (Moody & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot & 
Lamont 2000)21. 
But the same research (ibid.) also shows that this feature of legitimacy is not 
universal. In the US, it was seen as a completely ordinary way of presenting 
political claims. But even there, one can question, at what point a reference 
to the good of a small number of people turns from private interest to the 
common good (as is done in Moody & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot & Lamont 
2000)? And in Article I in this work, residents of Helsinki routinely argue on 
the basis of their own interest, and even that of the neighbourhood, or small 
group. So we have to do something to the problems of legitimacy and gener-
                                                   
20 It is entirely possible that these problems only manifest themselves when we look 
at the public or semi-public level of politics, and do not present themselves in e.g. 
ethnographic research, or in other situations more directly linked to individuals in 
cognitive situations. 
21 Regarding the all-encompassing nature of On Justification: of course all argu-
ments possible could be interpreted as being somehow about the common good – 
voicing private interests could be seen as tacitly endorsing market worth, or only 
being a different mode of civic justification, or whatever. This, while possible, would 
completely move all the work done in On Justification into the realm of residual 
categories. I suggest that a more substantial interpretation of certain arguments can 
be arrived at by defining them in different terms, and that the categories presented 
in On Justification are better utilized if they are used only as references to the com-
mon good (in relation to the concept of general will.) 
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ality: how to construct legitimacy not based on common goods and general 
will? At the same time, we can attest the problem of the level of the collective 
actor: in public discussions, it is not only individuals who argue based on 
their private interests, but also collectives, and even more often, individuals 
who claim to represent a collective (see Eranti 2011, Chapter 7).  
3.4  THE GRAMMAR OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 
How can comments not based on common goods be legitimate? To answer 
that question, we must also engage with the questions of commonality and 
generalizability: the grammar of liberal individuals (as presented by Thé-
venot) is seen as being of a lesser level of abstraction than the grammar of 
public justification, but also crucially as being able to include differing opin-
ions within the same community. Justifications operate on the level of prin-
ciples, of abstract common goods put into tests in situations. Because these 
goods are abstract, and by definition based on common humanity, they are 
available for everyone as a repertoire of actions and rhetoric. So how would 
the grammar of individual interests meet these requirements?  
In what follows, I reconstruct the grammar of liberal individuals operating in 
the public (Thévenot 2014, 2015), using a model of how common goods are 
constructed that differs from the one that is used in the grammar of public 
justification. I shall call it the grammar of individual interests – to both dis-
tinguish it from the original usage by Thévenot, and to distance it from the 
reference to the unclear and polysemic concept of liberalism. I shall also do 
this reconstruction without referencing the regimes of engagements, because 
the idea is based on the hierarchical idea of ordering different actions based 
on generalizability of the arguments. In the theory of regimes of engagement, 
rooted in a kind of ad-hoc cognitive structuring, the common good, con-
structed through the general will, is always the most abstract. In this recon-
struction, the grammar of individual interests is based on a completely dif-
ferent idea of how the common good works. The reconstruction requires that 
we first understand the relation of public justification, general will, and the 
sovereign a little better. 
In the grammar of public justification, the explicit aim of the prototypical 
discussion is to resolve situational conflicts by referring to most general level 
foundational ideas available in political culture. This happens by referencing 
common goods – general principles. These general principles always argue 
about the good for all, about the general will. Thus, the model of public justi-
fication is a model of deliberation: situations are formulated as conflicts of 
different public goods, compromises between them are made, and in the end, 
the polity as a collection of rational actors comes to an informed decision. It 
is implied that the theoretical model for this decision is unanimous. (see Pol-
letta 2008, and Young 1996, for this kind of deliberation).  
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The grammar of public justification is linked with the concept of sovereign: 
deliberation – between shared formulations of the common good – is about 
finding an agreement on the general will, which then works as the basis of 
application of sovereign power (see Rousseau [1762] for The Social Contract, 
discussion on it in On Justification, 107-111, Baczko [1988] on the social con-
tract and the French revolution, Iris Marion Young [1996] and Seyla Ben-
habib [1996] on deliberative democracy contrasted with interest-based or 
aggregative democracy, and Rosanvallon [2013] for the legitimacy of inter-
est-based democracy). 
This sovereign, earlier personified by the monarch, is usually an abstract de-
scription of the state. But a concrete example to highlight the idea of the sov-
ereign: in Helsinki urban planning, this sovereign power lies within the city 
planning authority. It ultimately makes all the decisions in city planning, in 
conjunction with the democratically elected councillors. Thus, the residents 
that are arguing against planning changes using the grammar of public justi-
fication are trying to win the support of the sovereign: to prove that their po-
sition is what is good for everyone, not just for themselves. 
In the grammar of individual interests, in order to make a legitimate claim, 
an actor must construct a subject that can legitimately argue its interests – 
and then nominate herself as the legitimate representative of that subject. 
The general will is not assumed to be a transcendent property of a sovereign 
entity, but composed of all the individual wills – all the interests and wills are 
legitimate and relevant (cf. Young 1996, 126-128, Rosanvallon 2013, 274-
276.).  
The prototypical case of the legitimate interests of subjects is the idea of the 
referendum: without any regards as to the reason or justification behind in-
dividual votes, each citizen as a right-carrying subject chooses an alternative, 
and the idea with most votes (or more usually, the one with over 50% of 
votes) gets chosen. In a referendum, the sovereign acts based on votes, not 
based on arguments. The deliberation is a separate action from the actual 
decision (See Baczko 1988, Young 1996, 120-121, Rosanvallon 2013). 
What is implied is the legitimacy of differing opinions and claims, even with-
out justifications. This does not mean that the level of generality or generali-
zability is necessarily lower than in publicly justified positions. Whereas the 
generality in public justification comes through principles – arguments are 
always about what is the common good – the generalization in the grammar 
of individuals comes through the construction of the subject as a group of 
people sharing an opinion. While the general model is based on the idea of 
individuals as the subjects with claims, interests, and individual wills, these 
subjects can also be constructed as larger bodies (Moody & Thévenot, 2000).  
The difference in the collectives between the civic order of worth and the 
grammar of individual interests is, that the latter operates without the notion 
of supressing your own will for the good of the collective that is evident both 
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in the civic order and in the grammar of public justification. These are opt-in 
communities. The legitimacy of these kinds of constructed subjects is an in-
teresting question that is explored by Rosanvallon (2013), and is not pursued 
further here.22 
To show how these subjects are created and their interest argued, I take an 
example from Article IV. In the comment letters sent to the city planning au-
thority about an imminent planning change, many residents of Rastila con-
structed “the people of Rastila” as the de facto writer of their comment let-
ters. The implied argument is that “the people of Rastila” is a political subject 
that a) can legitimately comment on whether a new neighbourhood should 
be built in the forest near the current Rastila, and that b) the opinion of this 
subject is unanimously against the new development. They were able to rep-
resent this subject in the media and act as a unified actor in opposition to the 
plan. (See Alapuro [2010] and Bourdieu [1991] for analysis of this kind of 
representation within political actors and voluntary associations – this con-
structed representation can also be seen as an act of dominance disposses-
sion of the people who the actor claims to represent.) 
The subject of “people of Rastila” was inclusive, but with two conditions: to 
join it, one had to 1) share the opinion, and 2) be from Rastila (this latter is 
not as strict: the membership is not dependent on the personal experience 
and relation, as it would be in the grammar of close affinities). In this exam-
ple, this subject was both an existing thing (some of the residents formed a 
social movement that acted against the planning project, see Article IV), and 
a fiction: these subjects overplay both their popular support and the unanim-
ity of the people. The majority of the “people of Rastila” did not participate in 
any kind of discussion, and in a comparable case in (almost) neighbouring 
Marjaniemi, it turned out that the majority of the residents were in favour of 
the contested change in land use – despite strong public opposition present-
ed in the name of “the people of Marjaniemi” (Kuparinen 2005). 
Since the grammar of individual interests is based on the idea that the gen-
eral will is a sum of individual wills, all individual positions can be legiti-
mately expressed.  Whereas the grammar of public justification requires a 
higher common principle to be used in the evaluation, in the grammar of 
individuals, small groups can present their positions, their individual wills, 
                                                   
22 And at the same time, the rules of the political culture are not identical to every-
one. While everyman might well say “I’m only in it for my own backyard,” that same 
option is not available for the more public members of the community, such as poli-
ticians and representatives – at least not in same capacity. The same is true for pub-
licity: it might as well be that we hope that the world would be a place where every-
one’s first thought would be the common good, and that is why newspapers and 
public officials are probably expected to present these justifications more promi-
nently. 
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and still be treated as individuals, not collective actors in the sense of the civ-
ic worth. 
One of the greater imbalances in the sociology of engagements has been the 
differing levels of explication between the three regimes and grammars. Ear-
lier I tried to show, how we could think about grammar of individual inter-
ests as legitimate and generalizable, in what follows, I present vignettes 
about what the grammar of individuals is on the substance level. 
Rosanvallon (2008: 25-26) divides suspicion and opposition against elected 
or otherwise ruling political organs into two main branches. The first suspi-
cion is suspicion of the ability of elected or chosen leaders or planners to ful-
fil and bring forth the general will. The other suspicion, a more fundamental 
form of what he calls counter-democracy, is based on what he calls liberal 
disbelief on whether general will exists at all. The central idea is to protect 
the individual and her interests against the central planner or decision mak-
er. This is one formulation of the individual grammar. These two different 
types of suspicion have been said to be exemplified by European (former) 
and American-style liberal (latter) political systems (Moody and Thévenot, 
2000; Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye, 2000, Lamont & Thévenot 2000). 
Within the urban planning literature, the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) has 
been the focal concept for discussions on the tension between the common 
good and private interest. Many analyses of NIMBY conflicts are rooted in 
the idea of the private interests of individuals (Freudenberg and Pastor 1992, 
Gibson 2005, Moody and Thévenot 2000, Wolsink 2006). Even though the 
general model of the grammar of individual interests is the referendum, ne-
gotiations and discussions are also part of the repertoire. These discussions 
are not deliberations on the relative merits of common goods, but rather 
trading, haggling, and presentation of individual situations and subjectivi-
ties. On the rhetorical level, the actors make demands, broker deals and issue 
ultimatums rather than not argue about principles on the general level. (Thé-
venot 2007, 2014, 2015; Moody and Thévenot, 2000). 
Many formulations of politicization (Luhtakallio 2012, 12, 170-190) are built 
around the idea of a rise in generality. This rise in generality has usually been 
seen as move to a more abstract level, and that has usually meant moving 
from one’s own private interest towards the common good. Since we already 
know that this is not the only way to present legitimate political claims, we 
will need to modify the thinking around this rise in generality. Luhtakallio 
underlines the fact that “the recognition of the possibility of conflict is central 
to politicization” (ibid. 186, see also Palonen 2003: an issue becomes political 
once it is playable). This conflict need not to be a conflict between principles, 
it can also be a conflict of interests (between, not within, individuals). 
Rosanvallon (2013) proposes that we should not look for a rise in generality, 
but a way to lower ourselves into generality. In his view, generality can be 
built as the sum of all the specificity of individual situations. The often-used 
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metaphor of rising to generality means leaving all the specificity below, and 
only seeing what is common and general – it means purifying oneself (and 
the situation) of the dirty details. The idea of Rosanvallon is, that we can also 
reach generality by wading in the details, since these details are what indi-
vidual lives are made of. These details and individual situations are all 
unique in some ways, and what can be generally recognized is the fact that 
from outside the situation, it is hard, if not impossible, to see the whole pic-
ture. 
The lowering into generality would happen through the level of publicity – if 
an actor publicly presents her situation and asks for recognition of its 
uniqueness, she shares only some aspects of it and – willingly or not – pre-
sents itself as a general case, even when arguing based on the specificity of 
her situation. This is clearly not the same as arguing from a common good – 
but neither is it just a private uttering of grievances. A similar kind of contex-
tualization can be said to happen when presenting private affinities in public 
– this happens in the form of a story. Since the central intention is to com-
municate the situation and communicate the special relationship, an evoca-
tive narrative must be formed (Young 1996, 130-133). 
In the participation in city planning, planning officials see the value of com-
ments and participation by individuals for providing contextual information, 
or subjective opinions, on how the planning change specifically affects their 
lives (Bäcklund 2007 158-170). Personal opinions and individual comments 
are valued not despite their being personal and individual, but because they 
are personal. 
Earlier, in Chapter 3.2, two models of how the common good is constructed 
according to Williams (1995) were presented. These two models include and 
suppose a higher common principle, or a common good, and are thus com-
patible with the ideas of public justification. But it is the third model, the 
Contract, which helps us to highlight the differences between the grammar of 
individual interests, and the grammar of public justification. In Williams’ 
Contract model of the common good (133-137) the creation of the public 
good happens through equal rights and citizenship, and “inclusion and par-
ticipation in society”. For Williams, this is deeply rooted in individual rights, 
and takes its formations from classical texts of liberalism. While Boltanski 
and Thévenot focus on how the general will is channelled and how individu-
als are subsumed, Williams emphasizes negative individual rights, and the 
individuality of the citizens: “The contractual model's language of rights var-
ies between the notion of liberty (the right to be left alone) and the notion of 
entitlement (the right to the means for achieving inclusion)” (ibid. 133). Wil-
liams also claims that this individuality does not lead to an atomized state of 
anomie, but rather that it always includes some elements of communality 
and some sense of responsibility towards a larger community. This falls quite 
nicely in line with what was outlined earlier about the grammar of individu-
als.  
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To sum up: in the grammar of individual interests, the common good is seen 
to rise out of the private interests of relevant actors. These actors can be indi-
viduals or constructed community-level political subjects. In public discus-
sions, the central rhetorical move is to construct the interest-holding actor – 
such as a smaller community within a city – and claim to represent this 
community. These communities are opt-in: all that is needed for member-
ship in them is to accept the interest as it is presented.  Since these interests 
are not articulated as principles, they can be adopted, discarded, haggled 
over, and eventually compromised (cf. Polletta 2008). 
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We now have a concept of how conflict resolution and goal-setting23 in a 
complex society might work. It includes three possible higher level scales of 
evaluation: one based on actors pursuing their self-interest, one based on 
common goods, and one based on intimate relations between people and the 
material world. In addition to this, the grammar of common goods is defined 
by struggles of the very definition of the common good, struggles between 
common goods, and the struggles of measurement within the common 
goods. Conversely, the grammar of individual interests is defined by strug-
gles between generalizable interests of individuals, and the grammar of pri-
vate affinities by strong emotional attachments. This threefold  
interpretation of justification is presented in table 1 below. 
 Common Good Individual  
Interest 
Close Affinities 
Scale of 
Evaluation 
Multiple common 
goods 
Self-interest of ac-
tors 
Intimate and 
emotional 
connections 
Defining 
Struggles 
1) Over definition of 
common good 
2) over situationally 
relevant common 
good 
3) over measurement 
within a definition 
1) Between interests 
2) Over construction 
of legitimate 
collective subjects 
3) over 
representation 
within the collective 
1) generalizing 
private 
attachments 
2) over inclusion 
into community 
3) over symbols, 
commonplaces 
Nature of 
the 
Community 
General 
Defined by State 
Humankind 
Flexible 
Situationally con-
structed 
Meso-Level 
Particular 
Based on Famili-
arity and sharing 
Exclusive 
 
 
Table 1: Three Grammars of Commonality 
                                                   
23 The discussion in this subchapter has built on the idea that deliberative democra-
cy (Young 1996, Benhabib 1996) is ontologically related to common good – and thus 
the grammar of common good is modelled on the ideas of deliberative democracy. 
We could say that in order to accommodate both the plurality of the definitions of 
common good, as originally proposed by Boltanski & Thévenot (and here note the 
similarities and the direct link with Waltzer, 1983), and the plurality of the gram-
mars of commonality as presented here, the model of deliberation needs to be re-
thought. One possible way of doing this would be to follow Mouffe (1999, 200) and 
to use her idea of Agonistic pluralism, where democracy (and thus deliberation) 
includes elements of both competition and co-operation. For the relation of this 
theory of democracy to participation in planning, see Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010) 
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As a coda to this discussion, we have to note the ultimate futility of all of this. 
The creativity of action and the creativity of actors means that all attempts at 
chopping such a continuous, culturally dependent, and ever-changing phe-
nomena such as political action, participation, and rhetoric into a discrete 
number of immutable boxes, no matter how well-defined, will always be a 
fool’s errand on some level. Panta rei – these things will always escape our 
precious little boxes. This does not mean we should not try – but that our 
attempts and toolboxes must live with this and be adaptable (this was, of 
course, is also noted in On Justification, as well as by Boltanski 2011).  
The argument presented here does not radically conflict with the spirit in 
which the theory of grammars of commonality is written. But it highlights the 
importance of the idea of the sovereign and the general will, and the multi-
plicity of ways it can be understood. It also highlights the idea of representa-
tion and political (collective) subjectivity as paramount to the legitimacy of 
argumentation in the grammar of individual interests. 
Thus, it perhaps sets a way for us for better understanding the pluralism of 
argumentation when understood as a cultural repertoire of valuation and 
justification, available situationally to individuals doing politics. 
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4 DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS 
This section presents the original publications, articles I–IV, and their re-
sults. The methods, materials, and analyses are presented as done in the 
original articles. Results are interpreted within the theoretical framework 
presented in earlier chapters.  
4.1  ARTICLES I  AND IV  
In articles I and IV, the residents of Haaga and Rastila faced a perceived out-
side threat to the continuation of their everyday lives. To deal with the crisis, 
they used the individual-level deliberative channel provided to them by the 
Helsinki land-use policy: they sent dispute letters to the planning official. In 
these letters, they strategically made political claims in opposition to the 
changes in their neighbourhoods. These claims used a diverse mix of argu-
mentative strategies: the residents discussed common goods using different 
definitions of common goods, and proposed tests for different common 
goods. However, they also argued on the basis of their individual interests 
and the fundamental uniqueness of their situation and habitat. To make the-
se claims more convincing, they creatively transformed the physical locations 
of Haaga and Rastila to an endless series of qualified objects (trees, roads, 
birds, 8 000-year-old shores of the Litorian sea, unique vistas from the win-
dow of a flat in Haaga), which were deployed in support of their argumenta-
tion. Their success in these land-use conflicts might have been limited – de-
tails change, but progress is inevitable – but this does not mean that their 
efforts were in vain. The residents constructed political subjects in their ar-
gumentation: the “residents of Haaga” as a claims-maker or a political actor 
is not a naturally existing subject but one that needs to be created through 
multiple engagements.  
ARTICLE SETTING, DATA AND METHODS 
Articles I and IV examine the situated creativity of specific individuals doing 
politics: residents acting against disputed land-use cases in their neighbour-
hoods. These people utilise cultural (and sometimes, also more tangible) re-
sources and qualify their surroundings by using them as parts of their argu-
mentation when engaging in NIMBY-type conflicts in urban planning. 
Articles I and IV share the same root, the justification theory, and even par-
tially the same data. Although they are both empirical articles, they make 
theoretical contributions – they answer different questions and offer differ-
ent conceptual clarifications.  
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The articles examine the dispute letters sent to the City Planning Authority of 
Helsinki by individual citizens to analyse their argumentation about disputed 
land-uses cases and, because the citizens are virtually always in opposition to 
the changes, the justifications for their opposition. Article 1 focuses on Finn-
ish political culture and the legitimacy of the grammar of individual interests 
(see Chapter 3.4), whereas Article IV focuses on the concept of NIMBY (not 
in my backyard), and what the argumentation of the residents acting against 
developments can tell us about the concept. 
The land-use disputes analysed in more detail were 1) an urban renewal plan 
in Haaga, which proposed the development of 700 new apartments suitable 
for families (The City-Planning Board 23 February 2009), and 2) a new de-
velopment for 15 000 people in Rastila (The City-Planning Board 28 Novem-
ber 2012). These two plans were chosen because they represented different 
ethos in the urban plans– the first being more local and conservative in na-
ture, and the second being more radical and garnering more intense citywide 
interest. Article I focuses on Haaga dispute, which produced 107 dispute let-
ters. Article IV compares the Haaga case with the Rastila land-use dispute 
(137 dispute letters) and uses a sample of 321 dispute letters from all over the 
city to compare these two to the distribution of the grammars of commonali-
ty in the entire city. These dispute letters were discussed by the city planning 
authority in 2012 and attached to the minutes of the meetings. These 
minutes are public in Helsinki. 
Article I analyses the dispute letters sent by the residents of Haaga. The cen-
tral assumption of this article is that although we cannot know the specific 
motivations of the people for sending the letters, we can safely assume that 
they believe, at least on some level, that their comments can be influential. If 
not, why would they have gone through the trouble of sending the comment 
letters? These letters are then used as a proxy of Finnish political culture in 
this specific case. In this article, pragmatic sociology is a tool that gives a 
more analytical description of the choices, vocabulary and grammar that are 
available to everyday political actors in Finnish society.  
Article IV presents a theoretical view of the NIMBY phenomenon. It defines 
NIMBY as a spatial political conflict and relates the different strands of the 
NIMBY literature to questions concerning democracy, participation and the 
three different grammars presented earlier. The benefit of pragmatic sociolo-
gy is that it allows research to take a third position between conflicting mor-
alistic positions – neither always for local opposition nor always against it. 
This third position is especially important when researching NIMBY move-
ments and NIMBY discussion because the discussion has been dominated by 
rather moralistic tones. By looking at the justifications used in the process, it 
becomes possible to open up the NIMBY discussion for a more analytical 
analysis.  
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NIMBY is seen as a label that is better at describing the conflict than the 
people who are parts of the conflict. These NIMBY-type conflicts are the 
kinds of crisis situations described earlier. 
ARTICLE I AND IV RESULTS 
In the papers, key argumentation rests on how the repertoires of evaluation, 
especially public justification and individual interests, are empirically used 
by the actors themselves in the conflicts. 
The major contribution of these two papers is that they use justification theo-
ry and, more specifically, the three grammars of commonality with the re-
constructed form presented in section 3.4 to empirically analyse what the 
residents see as legitimate ways of disputing urban land-use in their vicinity 
– how they present the situated critique in a situation that is interpreted as a 
crisis and how they creatively use their environment to present this critique. 
The distributions of the grammars of commonality used by residents can be 
seen in Figure 1 below. The clearest result is that the grammar of individuals 
is a legitimate way of building political argumentation in Finland or is at least 
a legitimate way of arguing against a land-use case in the area. This result is 
highlighted in article I. 
The results also show that participation cannot be thought of as simply delib-
eration or a neutral way of collecting information from citizens. The land-use 
conflicts are better seen as political conflicts, in which the central disputed 
item is the mode of evaluation. This result is highlighted in article IV. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the grammars of commonality in two cases and in the entire 
city (%). 
NIMBY conflicts are spatial political conflicts in which citizens and residents 
act to influence planning and building decisions by fighting over the systems 
of valuation used in the decision making and thus the relevant facts of the 
situation. NIMBY is therefore defined from the points of view of the residents 
and not those of the planners or city officials.  
NIMBY conflicts can be seen as much as conflicts of evaluation as they are 
conflicts of interests. All NIMBY conflicts are about a specific place, but 
some, based on close affinities, are uniquely rooted in the specificities of the 
place and the relations between the place and its residents. In the two cases, 
the commenters aimed at presenting the conflict on a more general political 
level: as a conflict of values (public justification) or interests (individual val-
uation) rather than a locally situated conflict about special relations to the 
place (close affinities).  
The opposition against the Haaga land-use case was successful in changing 
the minutiae of the plan. Many details were changed to better suit the de-
mands of current residents. The citizens, however, were completely unable to 
change the bigger picture of the plan or to stop the new developments. In 
Rastila, the activists failed in their project to halt the building of the new ar-
ea. The issue was politicised at the city level and was ultimately decided in 
the municipal council. Because the land-use case was not about building 
more houses into an already built environment but rather about expanding 
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the city to a recreational forest, the details were less important to the resi-
dents, and most attention was given to the general idea of the plan. 
It is no surprise that the possible changes happened to the small details. It 
corresponds to the idea put forward by Bäcklund (2007, 198) that the partic-
ipation by individuals primarily gives the planning apparatus contextual in-
formation from the area that is planned. The planner is still the one who 
makes decisions about the common good. Thus, by receiving information 
about the land-use conflicts from the residents, the planner can make better 
decisions.  
When a local land-use conflict gains citywide political attention, the picture 
looks different. Staffans (2004) noted that those citizens who went beyond 
the boundaries of participatory structure – those who used media and pub-
licity, informal means or a wide variety of tricks – were influential. The find-
ings from Rastila point to a different direction. The conflict in Rastila was 
politicised in an explicit and party-political way, and the dispute was ulti-
mately decided in the city council of Helsinki. The residents of Rastila used a 
wide variety of channels and even developed their own detailed plans for the 
area. This public orientation is visible in Figure 1: the residents used the 
grammar of public justification clearly more often than did the residents of 
Haaga.  
Industrial, domestic and green justifications were the three most commonly 
used justifications. The industrial justification, as has been noted earlier, has 
been seen as the default mode of Finnish politics, the repertoire that is most 
prominently available to everyone. The results strengthen this observation. 
The industrial justification was used in both land-use disputes, as well as in 
the citywide sample, in similar numbers. 
The difference between the conflicts is seen in the differences between the 
usage of green and domestic justification. Residents of Haaga framed their 
opposition in terms of tradition, the milieu of the area and the necessary con-
tinuation of what existed previously. The domestic justification was suitable 
for the conflict because the idea of the land-use was to build more houses in 
what is currently seen as a historic area with a specific feeling. The plan was 
to build new houses between existing structures, thus disturbing the every-
day surroundings of current residents. This “domesticicy” might also explain 
the high prevalence of the grammar of familiar affinities seen in Figure 1. 
In the Rastila case, the plan was to build a completely new housing develop-
ment in the forest near current buildings. Because this plan revolved around 
a forest that was going to be cut down and not about the intimate surround-
ings, the residents turning more towards a green justification is unsurprising. 
Strategically, this might not have been the best move; in the discussion in the 
city council that eventually resolved the conflict, green arguments lost to 
market-based argumentation. 
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As Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2012, see also Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010) not-
ed, despite being deliberative in ethos, the Finnish land-use and building act, 
in practice, gives ample possibilities for individual participation that do not 
need to confirm to the norms of the common good. The commenters in 
Rastila, Haaga and all over Helsinki were willing and able to critique urban 
plans, support the critique with justifications and mobilise their physical en-
vironment as a part of their arguments. They acted creatively as individuals.   
4.2  ARTICLE II:  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
CAMPAIGNING 
Article II (Sosiaalinen media ja kampanjointitapojen muutos in Finnish) 
explores the 2012 presidential campaign of Pekka Haavisto (Green Party), 
who unexpectedly came second in the race. His campaign was run in a much 
more open way than any previous (almost) successful electoral campaign in 
Finland. The focus of the article is on how social media changed the way elec-
toral campaigns are run. The paper was co-authored with Dr. Juho Lind-
man24. 
The article examines elections, which can be thought of as a perpetually oc-
curring crisis from the perspective of political actors—normal action cannot 
continue, someone wins and others lose on a pre-set date. However, the 
changing technologies (social media) and changing legal environment (cam-
paign funding laws) highlight the role of opportunity. Autonomous individu-
al campaigners, many of whom are professionals in non-political fields and 
first timers in electoral campaigns, forged a free-pulsing electoral campaign, 
which mostly organised itself in social media. They used any technical tools 
available (Facebook polls and custom web pages for crowdfunding, video-
editing software, YouTube for distribution) and were able to tap the shared 
collective nationalist symbols and re-appropriate them for a more progres-
sive use (Flashmob Finlandia). At the same time, however, these autonomous 
individual campaigners were constrained by the most mundane of things, 
such as the lack of funding, national-level organisation, resources and, worse 
name-recognition when compared with the main opponent; they also lacked 
experience in the later stages of the presidential race. They ended up winning 
many battles and losing the war. Nevertheless, they probably opened new 
possibilities for Finnish electoral politics. From the campaign, a new political 
                                                   
24 The 2012 elections colonised Facebook and Twitter newsfeeds in levels unseen in 
any previous elections. The sheer amount of normally non-political Facebook users 
who were, in one way or another, engaged in the elections was surprising: they 
wrote endorsements, created and shared memes and solicited micro donations. This 
phenomenon piqued my interests, so naturally, I asked my Facebook friends to 
write an article about it with me. Luckily, Dr. Lindman was interested. 
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figure, the autonomous individual campaigner – one with a background in 
technology, advertising or in other creative industries, is acutely aware of 
shifting cultural meanings and symbols, and is technically adept – emerged 
victorious.  
The article is an explorative case study that maps an interesting electoral 
campaign through key-person interviews, social media materials and elec-
toral funding records. It focuses on how individual actors participate in a 
traditionally very centrally organised type of politics: the presidential elec-
tions. It also explains how these actors rely on the organisational tools that 
are available them, mainly social media tools, such as Facebook groups, to 
create temporary collective structures. These structures are used during the 
campaign and discarded afterwards. The article also explains how the context 
for political action, the social media, influences the cultural repertoires of 
action that are available to the actors. 
ARTICLE SETTING, DATA AND METHODS 
The 2012 Haavisto campaign was run seemingly in a paradoxical way. The 
literature on mediatisation and professionalisation in electoral campaigns 
(Mancini 1999, Negrine 2007, but also Gibson 2015, Gibson et al. 2013) sug-
gests what we intuitively know: modern electoral campaigns are primarily 
created in the media through ads, talk show appearances and crafted slogans. 
The Haavisto campaign obviously did all of these, but it also included a 
strong online component. The official campaign spent heavily on then-
nascent social media marketing, which was amplified by the “unofficial” 
campaign created by interested individuals with little or no connections to 
the official campaign. These online campaign groups were left without over-
sight from the official campaign office. 
The viral part of the campaign was composed of multiple independent cam-
paign groups and projects that had different levels of engagement with the 
official campaign. We analysed different types of materials created by indi-
vidual groups and distributed through social media, such as photos, YouTube 
videos and Internet pages. 
We identified four individual campaign projects that contributed to the over-
all campaign, conducted key-person interviews with both party campaign 
officials and autonomous activists in the project groups, as well as collected 
and analysed social media materials produced by the four individual groups. 
Our intent was to present and analyse the campaign materials produced by 
these four groups and use the analysis to discuss the novel dynamics of social 
media and electoral campaigns. The analysis was enriched with electoral 
funding records because micro donations and the dynamics of crowdfunding 
were of central importance to the campaign. 
The main themes of the interviews were the role social media in the organisa-
tion and formation of the campaign groups, the motivations for participating 
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in the campaigns and the reason(s) why these campaigns were not organised 
a as part of the official campaign. In total, we conducted seven interviews 
focusing on personnel from the campaign group and officials of the Green 
Party. In addition to official campaigners, we included individuals who par-
ticipated mainly through independent activity groups on social media. The 
interviews were conducted as open-themed interviews and took place after 
the campaign.  
To complement these interviews and social media campaign materials, we 
drew from the campaign memorial co-authored by Haavisto’s campaign 
manager and published as a book entitled, President of Hearts (Kämppi and 
Lähde 2012). 
ARTICLE II RESULTS 
As noted briefly in Section 3.2 but missing from the analysis in article II be-
cause of a different theoretical framing, the entire organisation of the Haavis-
to campaign was guided by the project order of worth described by Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005). It was a project in which people contributed their per-
sonalities and skills for a limited amount of time, and the project had a de-
fined outcome or end point. A worthy participant had the needed skills and 
personal connections and was able to turn these into useful assets for the 
campaign. These good participants were also (essentially) self-directed and 
acted without direct oversight from the campaign organisation.  
Volunteering in a rhizome-like free-flowing memetic Internet electoral cam-
paign is not about handing out leaflets on the streets but rather about creat-
ing viral videos with one’s laptop, with or without endorsements by the offi-
cial campaign. The good participants, who possessed these technical skills, 
are members of such networks, have access to relevant technologies and are 
super-charged – they can be said to hold the key to virality and thus the key 
to organising these campaigns in their fingertips. 
  56 
 
Picture 1: A screenshot from TheIsojunno’s YouTube video “Haavisto Plays Dubstep” 
You cannot have an army of Internet warriors working without oversight to 
create memes and adding fuel to the fire without picking up some cultural 
elements from the Internet as you go. For the YouTube user TheIsojunno, his 
skills and technical equipment, his repertoire of shared symbols and his de-
fault repertoire of action made clear that the most natural form of political 
campaigning would not involve going out on the streets. He would rather 
spend a few hours on his computer and create YouTube videos with electron-
ic music. These videos garnered almost 10 000 views before the election, 
which are not really that much, at least compared with big viral hits, but have 
a good bang for the buck. Picture 1 above shows a screenshot of TheIsojun-
no’s video, “Haavisto Plays Dubstep”, in which a Photoshop-edited picture of 
Pekka Haavisto on a DJ set is shown, while a dubstep song with samples 
from Haavisto’s speeches plays in the background. For TheIsojunno, the 
presidential election was an event in which he was able to use and manipu-
late the particular collection of signs he was most familiar with and use them 
politically. 
These individual campaigners used framings, organisational links, technolo-
gies and cultural representations, such as memes, in a creative way to con-
duct an electoral campaign, in which participation was also rewarding in it-
self. Another example of this usage is The Pekka Male Voices Choir, which 
was organised in social media with the use of existing social networks (the YL 
Male Voices choir) and their resources (practice areas in a student house). 
Flash mob was a part of the repertoire of protest available for this campaign 
group. They appropriated a clearly nationalist symbol, the Finlandia Hymn, 
which they were able to reclaim. They connected with another campaign 
group, the Filmmakers for Pekka Haavisto, to film the flash mob. Then, the 
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official campaign used money collected through micro-donations to broad-
cast the recording (or the short film/ music video) in primetime TV. 
All these were done by individual campaigners, without direct organisational 
links to the official campaign and without oversight, by using frames, sym-
bols, social networks and organisational techniques available. 
In the examples we present in the article, social media was used primarily as 
a means of organising: Facebook and social media enable fast non-
hierarchic organisation among people who do not previously know one an-
other. Organising and inspiring core volunteers were more important than 
attracting a large number of page views. The central idea of the Haavisto 
presidential campaign was to encourage autonomous participation with the 
use of social media. The campaign organisation believed that it could not 
succeed in the elections by using traditional organising techniques. Social 
media was used to collect funds, recruit campaigners and motivate those who 
already expressed willingness to participate in the campaign. 
The increase in social media organising in itself also leads to a decrease in the 
power of the central organisation. When almost anyone can found his or her 
own Haavisto group, create events, share them on Facebook and have thou-
sands of spectators, the full control of the campaign by the campaign organi-
sation becomes impossible. 
In the Haavisto campaign, key campaign ads, the majority of the funding and 
even campaign themes were created or solicited via campaigners working 
autonomously from the official campaign organisation.  
The article also makes a point about electoral research and why it is im-
portant that sociologists research elections. The strands of political science 
that are based purely on reductionism (which, of course, does not describe all 
political scientists) cannot capture the dynamics of volunteers, frames, ideo-
logies and memes. A related point can be made about studying losing elec-
toral campaigns: The Haavisto campaign did not produce a president, but it 
did set a rather forceful example and shook Finnish social movement culture. 
Another related point is that the Haavisto campaign also finely illustrates the 
cycles when new innovations become institutionalised and written in law. 
The campaign finance reform (2009) changed the nature of financing elec-
toral campaigns and made possible the crowdsourced nature of the Haavisto 
campaign. These changes, in turn, set examples for a slew of follow-up pro-
jects and broadened the repertoire available for future projects, both within 
and outside electoral campaigns. 
One of the biggest phenomena in 2016 US politics was the primary campaign 
of Bernie Sanders, a “democratic socialist” aiming for Democratic nomina-
tion. The unofficial slogan of his campaign was #feelthebern, which was cre-
ated by a group of volunteers and organisers separate from the actual cam-
paign and closely resembled the Haavisto groups presented here – People for 
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Bernie and their digital strategist Winnie Wong. The hashtag was created to 
resonate and engage people, especially the younger ones, on social media 
(Lazzaro 2016). The cultural repertoire of the Internet is leaking. 
4.3  ARTICLE II I :  THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACEBOOK 
LIKE BUTTON 
In article III, the everyday use of the smallest online signal possible, the Fa-
cebook like button, is explained to be a surprisingly creative endeavour. The 
interaction situation is no longer a physical, fleeting moment but a stretched 
and continuous field of interaction that is governed by ritual laws of interac-
tion. The article highlights the importance of the interaction situation for 
nano-politics: viral political symbols, such as those created in the campaign 
in article II, depend on likes to survive and spread. The like button, albeit 
governed by interaction rules and happening inside a “social” network, is an 
individualistic tool – each user of Facebook is constantly in a situation in 
which he or she has the opportunity to like an almost limitless number of 
things. In addition to idiosyncratic preferences, these patterns of likes are 
cultural repertoires in themselves. Because social media is becoming more 
and more important in its role in how news is made, spread and interpreted, 
these processes do not remain merely interactional. They have larger conse-
quences. 
Facebook, with its billion of active daily users and three billion daily likes is 
both the leading social network and perhaps the leading cultural reference 
point of our current world. Article II focused on how Facebook can be used in 
organising an electoral campaign and how it should be understood as an or-
ganising tool rather than as a media platform in these contexts. The viral na-
ture of Facebook and the central importance of this virality for participation 
and politics conducted on Facebook highlight the importance of how the 
mechanisms and tools of Facebook are used in political processes. It is also 
an important part of the changing repertoire of tools: the specific nature of 
the Facebook Edgerank algorithm25 and ever-so-slight alterations to it might 
mean the difference between a successful social movement and a one-night 
fad, or between being elected and being forgotten. 
Article III is a Goffmanian exploration of the use of the Facebook like button. 
It constructs Facebook as a “physical setting” comparable to physical situa-
tions, in which Goffman analysed the attempts at keeping and saving face. 
                                                   
25 Edgerank is the algorithm (or a group of algorithms) that Facebook uses to de-
termine what an individual user sees in his or her newsfeed. In addition to Google’s 
PageRank, it might be the most important player in modern communications be-
cause it can determine what we can know, what we can see when we are online and 
what we can interact with.  
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The article uses the perspective of political interaction – when the rules of 
interaction in the situation also determine the outcomes of political partici-
pation or they, at least, channel the political action. An individual liking (or 
not liking) content on Facebook is also one of the perfect metaphors for an 
individual doing politics. 
Some of the Goffmanian concepts need to be translated to better suit mediat-
ed surroundings, such as Facebook, but one needs to keep in mind that 
Goffman himself also hinted at the possibility of face-work in mediated situa-
tions. The empirical data of this article are from a small classroom survey, 
which is used more for illustrational purposes.  
As noted in Chapter 3.1, the Facebook like button, in all its simplicity, seems 
to be the perfect embodiment of the fame order in On Justification—it allows 
one to “like” any content on Facebook, and it signifies how many users in 
total have liked the content. (Facebook now also shows information on how 
many users have shared the content. Almost everything said about liking can 
mutatis mutandis be applied to sharing because liking on Facebook is also a 
public action.) 
Therefore, the like button creates an instant test for popularity: How many 
people have liked the link? How many have shared it? This information easi-
ly separates the worthy from the unworthy (in the language of On Justifica-
tion). However, the empirical findings from article III also show a more nu-
anced picture. The theoretical framing of the article combines face-work 
(Goffman 1967) and ego-network analysis to understand the social context of 
liking, social signals sent with the like button and the social reasons for liking 
and non-liking. 
The understanding of the nuanced face-work and the qualitative understand-
ing of the heightened network sensitivity presented in the article help us un-
derstand what is called nano-level politics – how political signals, such as the 
like button, work on the smallest possible scale.  
Article III can also be seen as an exploration of how creative individuals use 
technological tools for a much broader spectrum of actions than probably 
was originally intended, and how this creativity is tied to the interaction situ-
ation.  
Researching social media, especially researching specific features of one web 
page (and a set of apps) is a tricky thing; it is always historical work. In the 
winter of 2016, Facebook replaced the simple like button with a set of ani-
mated emojis; in addition to the like button, we now have “love”, “haha”, 
“wow”, “sad” and “angry”. Therefore, the detailed results of the paper (pub-
lished in June 2015) are already historical. This change, however, does not 
affect the broader theoretical results. 
This article was co-authored with Professor Markku Lonkila.  
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ARTICLE SETTING, DATA AND METHODS 
Article III has a clear division of its theoretical and empirical parts. In the 
theoretical part, we explore the notion of face – feeling at ease in a social sit-
uation – and how the everyday identity work can be applied to online con-
texts. Face-work is the conscious (and unconscious) effort we all put into so-
cial situations to keep our positive self-identity, as well as other people’s 
positive evaluation of us.  
As a tool for the positive evaluation of social gestures, the Facebook like but-
ton is a good conductor for face-work. It presents nano-level interaction, the 
smallest signal that can be sent on Facebook. Our theoretical understanding 
can be divided into the following two parts:  
1) On Facebook, the situation in which face-work is done is and is not similar 
to the physical interaction situation. Face-work is asynchronous in the same 
way that the use of Facebook is asynchronous. This asynchrony also means 
that we need to reconsider the notion of face – in such an asynchronous set-
ting, the face stretches.  
2) All actions on Facebook happen in front of a networked audience, which, 
on the one hand, is hand-curated by the user and, on the other hand, often 
includes a surprising number of people not chosen by the user. This all cre-
ates heightened network sensitivity to users and affects the usage of the like 
button. 
On Facebook, we therefore have two contexts. The algorithms and the fea-
tures of the program define the technical context. This technical context de-
fines what is possible, what actions can be performed and how such actions 
are broadcast to other users. When Facebook, in early 2016, added other 
possible reactions to the like button, it changed the technical context. The 
social context is formed by actors’ Facebook friends and their friends’ friends 
(or even potentially everyone on Facebook), if their security settings allow 
this.  
The study was conducted among 26 Finnish university students in the spring 
of 2013. We chose a convenient sample of students because of the explorato-
ry nature of this article and our focus on understanding the broader frame-
work of sociality on Facebook. The respondents were 25 years old, on aver-
age, seven were male, and all respondents had a Facebook account for an av-
erage of five years. They were given a structured questionnaire concerning 
their motives and methods for using the Facebook like button.  
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The first group of questions 
concerned social pressure. 
Basing on our theoretical 
views, we hypothesised that 
to conduct face­work on Fa-
cebook, the users need to 
pay constant attention to 
what other users are think-
ing – that the social context 
has an effect on how the 
technical context is put into 
use (this model is presented 
in Picture 2). We thus in-
quired if the respondents, in 
general, considered the 
opinion of their Facebook 
friends whenever they used 
the like button, and if so, if 
they had a specific friend or 
friends in mind. We also 
asked if the respondents 
checked, before liking some-
thing on Facebook, who else liked it, if they had regrets regarding their liking 
activities because of social reasons and if they tried to align their likings with 
their Facebook friends’ perceptions of their Facebook behaviour. The latter 
questions were meant to determine whether face-work happens and whether 
it is affected by the networked nature of Facebook. 
The second group of questions addressed the creativity of different likes on 
Facebook. We tried to gain insights into the multiple motives for the use of 
the like button in social interaction. In addition to the intended use of the 
like button as a positive evaluation of other users’ posts, we wanted to deter-
mine how it was used to build up and maintain a public face and to make, 
strengthen and break relationships. We compiled a list of 16 ways or modes 
of using the Facebook like button.  
RESULTS: NANO-POLITICS OF FAME, CREATIVITY OF THE LIKE 
Our empirical data suggest that users do reflect on their liking on the basis of 
previous likes and that the networked audience affects users’ liking behav-
iour. We also found that liking is used in a wide variety of ways, which range 
from regulating a conversation to signalling the strength of ties between us-
ers and maintaining a face in situations that threaten it. 
The first result shows that Facebook users do, at least, sometimes think of 
the social impact and consequences of their liking behaviour both prior to 
and after using the like button. Most of the respondents were worried about 
Picture 2: A Facebook user and his or her personal
network audience. User F4 sees that users F1–F3
have already liked the object posted by the original
user. F4’s decision is influenced by this information. 
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losing face because of their liking behaviour, and most of them adjusted their 
liking behaviour after checking who their previous likers were. 
Secondly, we looked at the wide variety of signals that the like button sends. 
Individuals utilising the simple binary button find a huge number of ways to 
send complex signals by using it. In addition to liking things that one “likes”, 
our respondents used the like button to flirt, tease, let other users know that 
they still exist, moderate discussions (if one likes a comment in a long com-
ment thread, one does not need to respond to it) and tell both Facebook and 
the other user that the link between them is an important one. 
Although the number of respondents was fairly small, the article shows the 
surprising complexity and richness of both the signals sent by the like button 
and the social thinking that happens before a user likes anything on Face-
book. From 26 respondents, we identified many different uses for liking and 
for non-liking, as well. 
The results of article III help highlight two things – how interaction rituals 
and the social context affect the use of Facebook and thus the nano-politics of 
the like button. As explored in section 2.4, the use of the concepts by Erving 
Goffman helps us analyse interaction situations that have political implica-
tions, such as the use of the like button, with conceptual clarity not achieva-
ble by other means. On the other hand, the important takeaway is related to 
the creativity of the action. The like button is (or was) a superficially simple 
way of communicating a positive evaluation of something, but in the hands of 
users, it was transformed into a surprisingly varied conductor of all kinds of 
social dynamics. The situated creativity of individuals doing politics takes 
over these kinds of technical tools. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS: PANTA REI 
Individuals have an abundance of legal, technical and cultural resources that 
they can exploit to bring about change in the world, and they are recognised 
as relevant actors within formal participation systems. Instead of complain-
ing over breakfast, we can create memes on Facebook and spread them 
around the world. Instead of complaining about how new developments are 
ruining the neighbourhood, we are legally allowed to comment on these 
building projects and engage with all sorts of activities in our intimate sur-
roundings to change the course of development. The resources and reper-
toires available also constrain us – we are not the ultimately liberated “free” 
individuals that some scholars of online participation fantasised about. Even 
if individuals are not tied anymore to the formal and traditional organisa-
tional structures, we are constrained by the rules of interaction situations. 
The way by which individuals do politics is understood in three parts: 
1) All political action happens in a situation, which can, because of internal or 
external factors, be interpreted as a crisis or an opportunity: as binding con-
flict in which a solution must be found, and as a realisation that, for some 
reason, what previously seemed impossible is now doable. When residents 
face imminent plans to change the neighbourhood, they also have the oppor-
tunity to improve the details of the plan while disputing the broader goal of 
the development. 
2) More specifically, political action happens in the context of political cul-
ture. This political culture manifests not only as institutions that limit possi-
bilities for creative action but also by providing cultural tools, repertoires of 
symbols, frames and justifications that can be effectively and creatively de-
ployed. These cultural tools, together with more tangible resources (such as 
money, property or video production tools), form a large toolbox (Swidler 
1986). Actors create their strategies for action by utilising available re-
sources. This strategizing is not (only) calculative and interest maximising 
but also affected by emotions, connections and institutions. Therefore, if 
making electronic dance music videos is what you know, and you want to 
contribute to a political campaign online, then you do politics by utilising the 
repertoire of electronic dance music videos. 
3) The deployment of these strategies and the use of these tools occur on the 
micro and nano levels of interaction, as well as on the macro level of the pub-
lic. Social media blurs the distinction between these two – it is simultaneous-
ly an interactional arena with some of the dynamics from face-to-face en-
counters; a place for connecting, organizing, and strategizing; and a news 
distribution system or media. The interaction situation both constrains and 
channels political action. Therefore, an actor holding political views that are 
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controversial among his or her Facebook audience needs to consider twice 
before performing the important likes: in addition to doing politics, he or she 
needs to maintain face in front of his or her audience. 
This work presented an outline for a sociological theory of political action by 
integrating a pragmatist approach to habits and situations with theories deal-
ing with cultural and tangible repertoires and resources, as well as by con-
structing a grammar of political speech that makes realising and inspecting 
the legitimacy of claims based on individual interests easier.  
Empirically, articles I–IV present investigations into the repertoires of legit-
imate argumentation, the creativity of political actors in social media politics 
and the rules of interaction situation governing the nano-politics of liking on 
Facebook.  
Firstly, the grammar of individual interests is a legitimate way of presenting 
a critique against urban planning, and, thus, attempts to make urban plan-
ning more communicative do not necessarily lead it to being more delibera-
tive. This result can with some reservations, be thought to be relevant for the 
broader Finnish political culture. Conflicts in urban planning can and should 
be thought of as political conflicts.  
Secondly, we saw the advent of a new type of political campaigner: one with a 
background in technology or advertising rather than in politics, connected 
and as independent as possible. This campaigner uses Facebook and other 
similar tools to create ad hoc campaign groups, utilises the cultural reper-
toire of the Internet and participates in politics when (and only when) he or 
she sees fit. As a context for nano-political action, Facebook also affects the 
way politics is done. Facebook users do reflect on their liking pattern on the 
basis of previous likes, and their networked audience affects their liking be-
haviour. At the same time, the “material” tools provided by Facebook (such 
as the like button) are used by activists and “normal” users alike creatively 
and reflexively: these users send a wide range of signals by using the simplest 
of tools, and they often reflect on their own liking behaviour. 
The articles in this work also present two conceptual developments. The con-
cept of nano-politics is presented in article III. It refers to the smallest possi-
ble public political gesture, which is, in this case, using the Facebook like but-
ton to send political signals. Article IV argues that NIMBY is useful only as a 
descriptive term, that it should not be used to refer to people participating in 
local land-use conflicts, but it could be used to describe these conflicts.  
The main theoretical contribution is the reconstruction of Thévenot’s 
“grammar of individuals in the liberal public” to the grammar of individual 
interests: a way of constructing legitimacy of political argumentation based 
on the (assumed) representation of groups sharing the same opinions. This 
formulations avoids both the pitfalls of assuming the cognitive format of the 
plan being uniquely constitutive in the argumentation based on individual 
interests, and the problems arising from the assumption that arguments 
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based on the common good enjoy a special legitimacy in all political cultures. 
Therefore, the role of individuals doing politics can be researched as an em-
pirical question.  
The investigation on the grammars of commonality conducted in Chapter 3 
tells us that we need a broader view of the legitimate ways of participating in 
democratic discussions than what, for instance, deliberative democracy can 
offer us, here following Mouffe’s critique (1999). Perhaps, we should ap-
proach it as a descriptive question: What kinds of justifications, in the broad 
sense, do people bring in democratic disputes? In other words, what kind of 
system and understanding of participation and democratic systems is actual-
ly constructed, if one follows the pluralist and actor-centric ideas of Boltanski 
and Thévenot? How should we understand the totality of pluralistic demo-
cratic structures, and how can both collective-first and individual-first ap-
proaches and all the different scales of evaluation used by actors be incorpo-
rated? These are questions worthy of further investigation. 
In the world of political participation, only change is certain. What can be 
trusted upon is the ability of the revolution to forge its own means (see Ed-
wards 2014, xii and 235), or, as Heraclitus put it, Panta rei: Everything is in 
flux, and nothing abides. 
In this work, this constant flux was understood theoretically as a natural con-
sequence of the creativity of action (Joas 1996). Actors are not only calcula-
tive and rational, nor are they only bound by structures – they are also guid-
ed by non-binding habits that leave room for new engagements and new 
ways of actions to form and for new habits to habituate  – for creativity of the 
political action. Even if you cannot step into the same stream twice, the riv-
erbed still is here, as well as the concept of the river. 
Even if everything is in flux and nothing abides, the flux can be understood 
by focusing on actual individuals doing politics.  
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